On 13 July 2013, the President of Zimbabwe proclaimed 31 July 2013 as the polling date for general elections. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (first applicant) set 14-15 July 2013 for special voting for disciplined forces and electoral officers as required by law. Of 63,268 successful applicants authorized to cast special votes, 26,160 (41.3%) were unable to vote due to the Commission's logistical failure to post ballot papers in time. The Commission issued a press statement indicating these voters would be allowed to vote in the general election on 31 July 2013. This sparked complaints: the MDC-T argued this would violate s 81B(2) of the Electoral Act which prohibits special voters from voting in any other manner. The Commissioner of Police requested recourse, arguing that denying the vote would violate constitutional rights under s 67 (right to vote) and s 239(g) (Commission's duty to provide electoral materials). The Commission applied to court seeking to allow the 26,160 special voters to cast their ballots on 31 July 2013.
IT IS ORDERED THAT: 1st Applicant takes all the necessary steps to ensure that its officers and officers under the command of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Respondents, authorised to cast ballots in terms of section 81 of the Electoral Act [Cap 2:13] who failed to cast their ballots on the 14th and 15th of July 2013 because of the unavailability of ballot papers, be and are hereby allowed to cast their ballots on the 31st of July 2013.
Section 81B(2) of the Electoral Act, which prohibits special voters from voting in any other manner than by special vote, must be interpreted consistently with the Constitution. The provision applies only in circumstances where all measures necessary to enable special voters to cast their votes have been taken by the responsible agents of the State. Where the State fails to provide the necessary facilities for special voting (such as ballot papers), the prohibition does not apply, and special voters retain their constitutional right to vote in the general election. The Constitution is supreme (s 2(1)), and any interpretation of legislation that would result in the violation of the absolute constitutional right to vote (s 67(3)) must be rejected. Parliament is presumed to have acted constitutionally and could not have intended to deprive citizens of their right to vote due to state failure to fulfill its obligations under ss 155(2)(b) and 239 of the Constitution.
The Court provided extensive guidance on principles of statutory interpretation, including: (1) The presumption of constitutionality requires that where a provision is capable of two interpretations, the court must adopt the meaning that gives effect to the Constitution; (2) The court does not interpret the Constitution in a restricted manner to accommodate legislation, but properly interprets the Constitution first, then examines whether legislation can fit within that framework; (3) Courts may depart from the ordinary literal meaning of words to remove absurdity and give effect to legislative intention; (4) The mischief rule allows courts to consider the context, objects, and mischiefs a statute was designed to remedy; (5) Words cannot be read in isolation but derive their meaning from context, including other statutory provisions, existing law, and the mischief being remedied. The Court also noted that the right to vote is absolute under the Constitution with no derogation provided for, emphasizing the fundamental importance of this right in a democratic society.
This case establishes important principles concerning the supremacy of constitutional rights over statutory provisions in Zimbabwe. It demonstrates the court's commitment to protecting the fundamental right to vote even where literal statutory interpretation would result in disenfranchisement. The judgment reinforces the principle that constitutional rights, particularly the right to vote, must be given practical effect and that state failures cannot be used to justify the deprivation of such rights. It also provides guidance on constitutional interpretation, emphasizing the presumption of constitutionality and the use of purposive interpretation to harmonize statutory provisions with constitutional guarantees. The case is significant in electoral law as it prioritizes substantive electoral rights over procedural requirements where state organs fail to fulfill their constitutional obligations.