On 1 August 2020, the applicant (ZESA Holdings) filed an urgent chamber application for an interdict against the respondent, represented by Messrs Sinyoro and Partners. Judgment was granted by Chitapi J (HH 554-20). On 28 October 2020, Messrs Sinyoro and Partners filed a bill of costs on a legal practitioner to client scale and a notice of set down for taxation. Messrs Muvingi and Mugadza, who later appeared for the applicant, contended that Messrs Sinyoro and Partners had acted without authority when filing the urgent application and challenged the taxation. They argued that reliance on Chitapi J's judgment was erroneous as it was subject to appeal. The matter was referred to a judge in chambers in terms of what was then s 313 of the High Court Rules of 1971 (now r 72(25) of the High Court Rules of 2021) to determine whether Sinyoro and Partners had authority to act for the applicant.
The court ordered that: (1) In terms of r 72(25) of the High Court Rules, 2021, the Registrar of the High Court Harare in his capacity as taxing officer or their nominee shall: (a) Guided generally by r 72 and specifically r 72(4) tax the bill of costs prepared by Messrs Sinyoro and Partners as between it and ZESA Holdings in case number HC 4078/20; (b) The notice of taxation and bill of costs shall be served on Messrs Muvingi and Mugadza Legal Practitioners representing ZESA Holdings (Pvt) Ltd.
The binding legal principle established is that the issue of a legal practitioner's authority to act for a client cannot be determined through the informal referral mechanism provided for in Rule 72(25) (formerly Rule 313) of the High Court Rules. Such issues go to the root of the legal practitioner-client relationship and have far-reaching consequences relating to ethical conduct. They require proper ventilation through formal proceedings. As long as a legal practitioner's authority to act has not been properly impugned, there is no reason why a bill of costs on a legal practitioner to client scale cannot be taxed. The referral mechanism under Rule 72(25) is intended for matters relating to the quantum and calculation of costs, not fundamental questions of authority and ethical conduct.
The court observed that filing heads of argument without proper context would not have placed the court in a better position to make a determination on the issue of authority. The court also noted that as far as it was aware, the judgment by Chitapi J was still extant. The court further commented that Messrs Muvingi and Mugadza ought not to have raised the issue of authority at the taxation stage, suggesting that the proper course would have been to challenge the authority through separate formal proceedings.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean legal practice as it clarifies the scope and limits of Rule 72(25) (formerly Rule 313) of the High Court Rules, which allows a taxing officer to refer points arising at taxation to a judge in chambers. The judgment establishes that this informal referral mechanism is not appropriate for determining fundamental issues such as a legal practitioner's authority to act for a client. Such issues go to the root of the legal practitioner-client relationship, involve ethical considerations, and require proper ventilation through formal proceedings rather than informal referral. The case also reinforces the principle that legal practitioner to client costs are independent of the outcome of the underlying litigation and that challenges to a legal practitioner's authority must be properly and formally impugned before affecting the right to tax costs.