Wilbert Munonyara v CBZ Bank Limited and Others

The applicant owned immovable property known as Number 1212 Marlborough, Township of Marlborough in the district of Salisbury. He mortgaged this property to the first respondent (CBZ Bank Limited) as security for a loan extended to the fifth respondent (Pritsborough Marketing). The fifth respondent defaulted on the loan repayment. The first respondent obtained a default judgment against the applicant and others on 17 February 2011 under case number HC 9134/10 for US$23,677.90 principal amount plus bank charges, interest and costs. The judgment declared the applicant's immovable property specially executable. The property was attached on 4 July 2011. The applicant then filed an urgent chamber application for stay of execution on 10 May 2012, almost a year after the attachment and more than a year after the judgment.

• Whether the applicant's chamber application was urgent given the inordinate delay of almost a year between the attachment of property and the filing of the application
• Whether a stay of execution should be granted in circumstances where the applicant delayed unreasonably in bringing the application

IT IS ORDERED THAT: The application is not urgent. The applicant should proceed in the normal way.

Where an applicant delays almost a year after attachment of property and more than a year after a default judgment before filing an urgent application for stay of execution, and proffers no cogent reason for such delay, the applicant's conduct exhibits no urgency and the matter cannot be entertained as an urgent application. Such an applicant must proceed through the normal court process rather than by way of urgent chamber application.

The court noted that it was "needless to say" that the applicant's conduct exhibited no urgency, suggesting that the lack of urgency was so obvious as to require minimal elaboration. This implies a strong disapproval of the attempt to use urgent procedures in circumstances of substantial and unexplained delay.

This case reinforces the principle in Zimbabwean civil procedure (which shares similar principles with South African law) that urgency is not self-created and that substantial delay in bringing an application undermines any claim to urgency. The case demonstrates that courts will not entertain urgent applications where the applicant has delayed unreasonably, particularly where the delay extends to almost a year. This is consistent with the approach taken in South African courts regarding the requirements for urgent applications and the principle that applicants must approach courts timeously when seeking urgent relief.