In August 1997, the appellant (Waste Management Services) and the respondent (City of Harare) entered into a five-year contract for the collection and disposal of domestic and commercial refuse within Harare. The respondent became dissatisfied with the appellant's performance. On 30 March 2000, in the afternoon, the respondent's Chamber Secretary sent a letter to the appellant notifying it that the contract was cancelled with effect from 31 March 2000, citing unsatisfactory performance and various breaches including collecting refuse from unallocated areas, failing to collect refuse from allocated areas, non-compliance with Director's requirements, and submitting fraudulent payment certificates. The appellant rejected the cancellation, sought to continue performing its obligations, but was denied access to the respondent's waste disposal site. The appellant then filed an urgent application in the High Court seeking to set aside the cancellation and to be permitted to continue performing the contract.
The appeal was allowed with costs (by majority decision). The order of the High Court was set aside and substituted with: (a) A declaration that the notice of cancellation given by the respondent did not in law amount to an effective termination of the contract; (b) The respondent to pay the appellant's costs. Note: The Court acknowledged that by the time of the appeal (2002-2003), the five-year contract period had expired (August 2002), so it was no longer possible to order specific performance, hence only a declaratory order was made.
The binding legal principle established by the majority is: (1) The right to resile from a contract must be exercised ex nunc (immediately); (2) A notice of cancellation, to be legally effective, must clearly and unequivocally convey an unqualified, immediate and final decision to treat the contract as at an end; (3) A notice which purports to terminate a contract with effect from a future date (rather than immediately) does not constitute an effective notice of termination in law, as it keeps the contract alive in the interim; (4) This principle applies to contracts generally, not only to contracts of lease; (5) The fact that the other party understood the notice to be a cancellation does not cure the defect of futurity in the notice.
Ziyambi JA in his dissent observed that: (1) While acknowledging merit in the view that the cases use "contract" to refer to contracts generally, he deliberately did not make a firm distinction between lease contracts and other contracts in the absence of full argument; (2) He suggested that what courts are concerned with is whether the notice is clear and unequivocal such that it leaves no doubt of the intention to cancel; (3) He noted that a notice period of only a few hours (from afternoon of 30 March to midnight commencing 31 March) should not qualify as the type of future-dated notice prohibited by the authorities; (4) He implied that an overly technical or artificial interpretation should not be placed on notices that clearly communicate an intention to cancel immediately or virtually immediately.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean contract law as it definitively establishes (by majority) that the principle requiring cancellation of contracts to be exercised immediately (ex nunc) applies to all contracts, not merely leases. It confirms that a party exercising a contractual right to cancel cannot validly give notice that purports to terminate the contract at a future date while keeping the other party bound in the interim. The case extends and clarifies the principles from Ganief v Hoosen and Jackson v Unity Insurance, applying them beyond the context of lease agreements to commercial service contracts. It emphasizes the requirement that a notice of cancellation must embody an unqualified, immediate and final decision to terminate the contract.