The applicant, a female Zimbabwean national, was employed by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) as a Website and Graphic Designer on 19 September 2017. Her employment was subject to a 12-month probation period (extendable by up to 6 months) under the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (General Conditions of Service) Regulations, SI 91 of 2008. The regulations permitted the respondent to terminate employment during probation for unsatisfactory performance. On 28 September 2018, the respondent notified the applicant in writing that her employment would not be confirmed. The applicant challenged this decision by way of an application for review in terms of the Administrative Justice Act [Chapter 10:28], alleging the decision was unfair, unreasonable, and made without proper notice, opportunity to make representations, or adequate reasons. The applicant sought reinstatement with back pay and benefits.
The application was struck off the roll with no order as to costs. The court exercised discretion not to award costs given the previous conflicting views in the High Court before the Supreme Court's clarification in Stanley Nhari.
The High Court does not have jurisdiction to determine employment disputes in the first instance, even when framed as applications for administrative review under the Administrative Justice Act. Section 89(6) of the Labour Act confers exclusive first-instance jurisdiction on the Labour Court for all labour and employment matters to which the Labour Act applies. The 2013 Constitution's separation of administrative rights (section 68) from labour rights (section 65) requires that employment disputes be adjudicated in the specialized Labour Court forum established by Parliament pursuant to the Constitution, not through administrative review proceedings in the High Court. An employer's decision to terminate employment, even when made by a constitutional body or administrative authority, constitutes an exercise of contractual power in an employment relationship rather than administrative action subject to review under the Administrative Justice Act.
The court noted that it would not have awarded costs to the successful respondent given the previous conflicting views in the High Court regarding jurisdiction over labour matters before the Supreme Court's clarification in Stanley Nhari v Mugabe. The court also observed that the applicant's argument regarding exclusion under section 3 of the Labour Act was not supported by the provision cited, as the respondent is an independent body with legal capacity and the applicant was not a member of the Public Service governed by the Public Service Act. The court indicated that had it had jurisdiction, there would have been no need for the applicant to invoke review powers as the Labour Act provides adequate remedies for employment disputes.
This case reinforces the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court over employment disputes in Zimbabwe post-2013 Constitution. It clarifies that employment-related decisions by state organs or independent bodies, even when characterized as administrative action, fall within the Labour Court's exclusive jurisdiction under section 89(6) of the Labour Act. The judgment marks a departure from the broader approach in U-Tow Trailers and aligns Zimbabwean law with the Supreme Court's authoritative pronouncement in Stanley Nhari that the High Court's broad constitutional jurisdiction does not extend to labour matters in the first instance. The case is significant for establishing clear jurisdictional boundaries between the High Court's administrative review function and the Labour Court's specialized labour jurisdiction, preventing forum shopping in employment disputes.