In 2014, the respondent Chitungwiza Municipality published a tender notice in the Herald newspaper for the supply of brand new plant and machinery, including a 20-tonne tracked excavator for US$182,000 and a 3-tonne front-end loader for US$105,000. The appellant claimed it responded to a different notice on the municipality's notice board for refurbished machinery and that the municipality's town clerk, G. Tanyanyiwa, awarded it a tender for refurbished equipment via a letter dated 6 July 2011, before the full council meeting held on 21 July 2011. The respondent paid a deposit of US$140,000. The appellant delivered a refurbished, dysfunctional excavator instead of brand new machinery as advertised in the tender. The appellant claimed the balance of US$119,300, while the respondent counterclaimed for a refund of the deposit, alleging breach of contract. The appellant could not prove the existence of any notice for refurbished machinery and relied on the unauthorized letter from the town clerk.
The appeal was dismissed with costs. The High Court's order was upheld: (1) The appellant's claim was dismissed; (2) The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent US$140,000 being a refund of the deposit; (3) The appellant was ordered to pay costs of suit in both the High Court and the Supreme Court.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) A contract is void ab initio where there is no consensus ad idem (meeting of minds) on material terms, specifically the nature and quality of the object of sale; (2) Section 210(4) of the Urban Councils Act constitutes a peremptory statutory prohibition that prevents municipal councils from procuring goods without procurement board recommendations and council approval; (3) Contracts made in violation of statutory prohibitions are legal nullities and unenforceable; (4) The Turquand rule does not apply to override statutory prohibitions or to validate fraudulent conduct; (5) An unauthorized official's actions that contravene statutory requirements do not bind a municipality; (6) Where no valid contract exists, money paid as a deposit must be refunded; (7) The burden of proof lies on a party asserting the existence of a contract to establish all essential elements, including a valid offer.
The Court made non-binding observations about the conduct of the town clerk G. Tanyanyiwa, describing it as "unlawful and unbecoming" and noting that the letter was "fraudulently calculated to prejudice other bidders and the respondent because it was meant to abort the whole purpose of the tender to identify the most suitable bidder." The Court also observed that the appellant's vacillation between claiming to have responded to a notice on the noticeboard versus responding to an amended tender undermined its case. The Court noted that the Turquand rule was "designed to protect gullible members of the public who innocently contract with company agents oblivious of their failure to observe internal procedures," thereby clarifying its protective purpose rather than as a tool to perpetuate illegality.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean law for several reasons: (1) It reinforces the mandatory nature of statutory procurement procedures under section 210(4) of the Urban Councils Act and confirms that municipal councils cannot contract without proper procurement board recommendations and council approval; (2) It clarifies the limits of the Turquand rule in corporate/municipal law, holding that the rule cannot validate contracts that are statutorily prohibited or tainted by fraud; (3) It emphasizes that statutory prohibitions are binding on all parties regardless of knowledge, as everyone is presumed to know the law; (4) It demonstrates that unauthorized actions by municipal officials cannot bind the municipality where statutory procedures are violated; (5) It confirms the requirement of consensus ad idem for valid contracts and that parties dealing with different terms do not create binding obligations; (6) It protects public procurement processes from internal manipulation and fraud by municipal officials.