The applicant (defendant in the main action HC 3982/12) was sued by the respondent (plaintiff) for damages to rental property, outstanding rentals, and bills totaling US$12,122.17. The matter progressed to pre-trial conference stage, scheduled for 27 January 2015 before Dube J. The applicant's former legal practitioners, Messrs Mushangwe & Company, had renounced agency on 6 November 2014, providing the applicant's last known address as 50 Lomagundi Road, Emerald Hill, Harare. The Sheriff attempted service of the notice of set-down on 8 January 2015 but the former legal practitioners refused service. The respondent's employee then served the notice by letterbox at "50 Lomagundi Road, Avondale, Harare" on 15 January 2015. The certificate of service filed was unsigned by the person who effected service. The applicant did not attend the pre-trial conference and Dube J struck out the defendant's defence and referred the matter to the unopposed roll. The applicant only became aware of the notice on 16 February 2015 when Christopher Siwada retrieved it from the letterbox. The applicant filed this application for reinstatement on 24 February 2015. New legal practitioners (Gonese Law Chambers) assumed agency on 24 February 2015.
The default judgment granted on 27 January 2015 against the applicant was set aside. The record was referred to the Registrar for re-setting down of the pre-trial conference. Costs of the application were ordered to be costs in the cause in the main action HC 3982/12.
A certificate of service under Rule 42B(1)(b) of the High Court Rules must be signed by the person who effected service to be valid; an unsigned certificate cannot constitute valid proof of service. The proper procedure for challenging a default judgment striking out a defence following non-attendance at pre-trial conference is an application for rescission under Rule 63, not an application for 'reinstatement' of the defence. Rule 63 is the default rule for rescission of default judgments given under the High Court Rules, including judgments under Rule 182(11) for default at pre-trial conference. To succeed in rescission under Rule 63, the applicant must establish: (a) the application is within the one-month time limit from knowledge of the judgment; (b) a reasonable explanation for the default; (c) the application is bona fide and not merely to delay; and (d) a bona fide defence with prospects of success exists. Courts have power and a duty to raise points of law mero motu to ensure decisions are based on correct application of law, in fulfillment of the principle of legality.
Chitapi J made several important obiter observations: (1) Courts should not be cited irrelevant authorities as this wastes judicial time - counsel should only cite relevant cases. (2) Rule 449 should be restrictively interpreted for rescission purposes as giving powers to consider representations by affected parties other than the parties to the case, and should not be used as an escape route by defaulting parties who are out of time under Rule 63. (3) The court encouraged greater use of Rule 63A (rescission by consent) where appropriate, noting that this progressive rule introduced in 1993 is underutilized by practitioners and could significantly reduce delays in litigation. The court noted that in this case, a 2012 matter was still pending in 2018 largely due to the rescission application. (4) The court commented on lawyers' relationship with figures, noting humorously that "lawyers and figures are not the best of friends" when noting a discrepancy in the sum claimed. (5) The court emphasized that legal practitioners should focus on speedy resolution of disputes with minimal cost, which is what clients want. (6) The court noted that in damages claims, there are always two issues to determine: liability and quantum, making summary judgment applications difficult.
This case clarifies important procedural matters in Zimbabwean civil procedure: (1) It establishes that a certificate of service under Rule 42B(1)(b) must be signed by the person who effected service to be valid; an unsigned certificate cannot constitute valid proof of service. (2) It confirms that courts can and should raise points of law mero motu even if not raised by parties, as courts have a duty to apply the law correctly and are guardians of legality. (3) It clarifies that there is no separate procedure for 'reinstatement' of a defence struck out at pre-trial conference - the proper remedy is rescission of the default judgment under Rule 63, not Rule 449 or common law rescission. Rule 63 is the default rule for default judgments granted under the High Court Rules. (4) It reiterates the three requirements for rescission under Rule 63: reasonable explanation for default, bona fides of the application, and bona fide defence with prospects of success. (5) It encourages greater use of Rule 63A (rescission by consent) to avoid delays in litigation. The judgment provides important guidance on service requirements and the proper procedural route for challenging default judgments following pre-trial conference defaults.