The first respondent was employed by the applicant as a Bursar under a fixed-term contract commencing 1 July 2017 for four years. In July 2018, professional differences arose between the respondent and the Vice-Chancellor regarding procurement and disposal of assets. The respondent sent a letter requesting discussion of his immediate exit and mutually determined termination. The Vice-Chancellor interpreted this as a resignation and prohibited the respondent from attending work. The respondent filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labour alleging unfair dismissal. A labour officer (the second respondent) conducted a hearing and found unfair dismissal, issuing a draft ruling awarding damages of USD $323,036.69, delivery of a motor vehicle, two laptops, a desktop, and 11,520 litres of fuel. The Labour Court confirmed the draft ruling. The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal. The applicant then sought direct access to the Constitutional Court, alleging violations of its rights to equal protection (s 56) and property (s 71) of the Constitution.
1. The application for leave to directly access the Constitutional Court was struck off the roll with no order as to costs. 2. In exercise of the Court's powers under s 19 of the Constitutional Court Act, the proceedings before the Supreme Court under Case No SC 671/23 together with judgment No SC 71/23, and the proceedings of the Labour Court under Case Number LC/H/429/22 and its judgment LC/H/31722, were set aside in their entirety. 3. No order as to costs.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) Section 93(5) of the Labour Act requires strict compliance with prescribed procedures for confirmation of draft rulings - the labour officer who made the ruling must personally depose to the founding affidavit and appear before the Labour Court to move for confirmation; this cannot be delegated to another person. (2) Non-compliance with the mandatory procedural requirements of s 93(5a) means there is no valid application before the Labour Court, and the court lacks jurisdiction to confirm the draft ruling. (3) Proceedings conducted without jurisdiction are a nullity, and nothing can stand on a nullity - such proceedings cannot form the basis of a valid appeal. (4) The Constitutional Court cannot declare violations of constitutional rights based on judgments that are the product of irregular proceedings constituting a nullity. (5) Under s 19 of the Constitutional Court Act, the Constitutional Court may exercise review powers in constitutional matters whenever an irregularity comes to its attention, even where the proceedings are not the subject of an appeal or application to the Court.
The Court made several non-binding observations: (1) While the respondent conceded that the applicant had pleaded sufficient allegations to trigger the Court's jurisdiction per the test in Meda v Sibanda, this alone is insufficient if the substantive application cannot succeed on other grounds. (2) The Court noted it is customary (though not strictly necessary) to make formal declarations that proceedings are null and void for the sake of certainty and convenience. (3) The Court observed that while courts may disregard certain issues raised by parties and concentrate only on decisive ones, this is permissible only where the selected issues are sufficient to resolve the dispute - courts cannot perfunctorily ignore preliminary objections. (4) The Court commented that the applicant's focus on alleged substantive violations of constitutional rights, rather than on procedural irregularities, meant it did not advance the most meritorious ground for challenging the judgment. (5) The Court noted that concessions made by counsel before lower courts may affect what issues can be raised on appeal or in subsequent proceedings.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean jurisprudence for several reasons: (1) It clarifies the mandatory procedural requirements under s 93(5) of the Labour Act for confirmation of draft rulings by labour officers, emphasizing that strict compliance is required and non-compliance renders proceedings a nullity. (2) It reaffirms that the labour officer who conducted the inquiry must personally depose to the founding affidavit and appear before the Labour Court - this function cannot be delegated. (3) It demonstrates the Constitutional Court's willingness to exercise its review powers under s 19 of the Constitutional Court Act proprio motu (of its own motion) in constitutional matters when gross irregularities come to its attention, even where direct access is not granted. (4) It establishes that a court cannot declare violations of constitutional rights based on proceedings that are fundamentally irregular and constitute a nullity. (5) It reinforces that courts must address preliminary points raised by parties rather than bypassing them to proceed to the merits.