The respondents were former employees of the applicant University who were dismissed for misconduct. An arbitrator found the dismissals unlawful and ordered reinstatement. When the University failed to reinstate them, the respondents obtained quantification of the award totalling approximately US$308,000. The respondents registered the arbitral award as an order of the High Court and commenced execution proceedings. The University's property, including its entire library and vehicles, was attached. Both the arbitral award and its quantification were under appeal before the Labour Court. The University applied to the High Court for a stay of execution, which was refused on grounds that the High Court lacked jurisdiction since the matter was on appeal before the Labour Court. The University then approached the Supreme Court urgently seeking to interdict execution pending appeal.
The application was granted. An interim order was issued interdicting the respondents from commencing or continuing with levying execution of the judgment pending determination of the appeal under case reference SC 360/12. Costs of the application were ordered to be costs in the cause.
Where an arbitral award has been registered as an order of the High Court, the High Court possesses jurisdiction to grant a stay of execution of that order, even where appeals against the underlying arbitral award are pending before the Labour Court. The existence of divergent legal authority on a point of law is sufficient to establish a prima facie right for purposes of interim relief, particularly where the balance of convenience favours the applicant and refusal of relief would render an appeal academic.
The Court observed that there appeared to be a divergence of legal authority on the question of whether, on a proper consideration of sections 92E and 98(10) of the Labour Act, appeals on points of law from an arbitrator's decision would operate to suspend execution of the judgment appealed against. The Court noted that divergent positions create legal uncertainty. The Court also observed that the question of whether the arbitrator's award was prima facie unreasonable and whether to exercise review powers under section 25 of the Supreme Court Act were matters best dealt with by a full bench of the Supreme Court rather than by a single judge in chambers.
This case addresses important issues regarding the jurisdictional interface between the High Court and the Labour Court in relation to execution of registered arbitral awards. It highlights the existing divergence in Zimbabwean jurisprudence on whether appeals from arbitrators' decisions under the Labour Act automatically suspend execution. The case is significant for establishing that where an arbitral award has been registered as an order of the High Court, that court retains jurisdiction to grant stays of execution notwithstanding appeals pending before the Labour Court. The judgment demonstrates the court's willingness to grant interim relief where legal uncertainty exists and the balance of convenience favours preservation of the status quo pending determination of substantive appeals.