Trustees for the Time Being for Chitungwiza Residents Trust and Alice Kuvheya v Chitungwiza Municipality and Others

On 1 June 2022, the Secretary for Provincial Affairs and Devolution issued a statement notifying the establishment of a Provincial Task Force comprising various government entities for the purpose of removing illegal invaders, demolishing illegal structures, and arresting land invaders in Chitungwiza and Harare areas. Around 13 July 2022, the respondents embarked on a joint operation involving forcible evictions and demolitions. The applicants, representing residents through a trust, filed an urgent chamber application on 29 July 2022 (later appearing as 10 August 2022 in the judgment), seeking to stop the demolitions on the basis that they were unlawful as the respondents had not provided adequate notice and did not have a court order as required by section 74 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. There had also been earlier notices issued in 2020 regarding similar demolitions.

• Whether the application met the requirements for urgency under the court rules
• Whether the urgency was self-created due to delay in bringing the application
• Whether the legal practitioner who certified the matter as urgent properly applied his/her mind
• Whether the respondents' demolition operations required a court order in terms of section 74 of the Constitution
• Whether the applicants had locus standi to represent residents
• Whether there was misjoinder of certain parties

The application was struck off the roll of urgent matters. There was no order as to costs.

Urgency which stems from deliberate or careless abstention from action until the deadline approaches is not the type of urgency contemplated by the court rules. Where a party becomes aware of impending action (such as through public statements or notices) but delays for an extended period (in this case over a month, or potentially from 2020) before seeking urgent relief, without explaining the delay in either the certificate of urgency or the founding affidavit, the application will be struck off the roll of urgent matters as the urgency is self-created. The certificate of urgency and supporting affidavit must always contain an explanation of non-timeous action if there has been any delay.

The court noted concerns about the certificate of urgency, suggesting the legal practitioner who certified the matter as urgent may not have properly applied his/her mind and appeared to have repeated verbatim what the applicant said in the founding affidavit. The court also noted that other points in limine had been raised (including lack of locus standi based on absence of supporting affidavits from affected residents, and misjoinder of certain parties including the City of Harare and Zimbabwe Republic Police) but stated there was no need to address these having disposed of the matter on the urgency point. The court did not express any view on the merits of the constitutional challenge regarding section 74 requirements for court orders before evictions.

This case illustrates the strict approach Zimbabwean courts take to applications for urgent relief, particularly the requirement that applicants must explain any delay in bringing the application and that urgency cannot be self-created through inaction. It reinforces procedural requirements for urgent applications and demonstrates that even matters involving constitutional rights (such as housing rights and the requirement for court orders before evictions under section 74 of the Constitution) will not be heard on an urgent basis if the procedural requirements for urgency are not met. The case serves as a reminder that parties seeking to challenge government action must act timeously and cannot wait until enforcement begins before seeking relief.