Triangle Limited and Others v Zimbabwe Sugar Milling Industry Workers Union and Others

On 10 November 2015, the first respondent (Zimbabwe Sugar Milling Industry Workers Union) served notice on the applicants (sugar industry employers) of its members' intention to embark on collective job action. On 16 November 2015, the applicants filed an urgent application before the second respondent (Minister) for a show cause order and disposal order in terms of section 106 of the Labour Act. On 18 November 2015, the applicants wrote to the Minister advising that negotiations were a nullity as the union's executive lacked authority to negotiate due to a provisional administrator being appointed. The applicants requested the Minister to resolve various issues by 25 November 2015 and indicated they would seek urgent court relief if not resolved. On 26 November 2015, the applicants filed this urgent chamber application seeking an interdict against the collective job action.

• Whether the matter satisfied the requirements for urgency under Rule 244 of the High Court Rules
• Whether the applicants treated the matter as urgent
• Whether the applicants had an alternative remedy available
• Whether the applicants would suffer irreparable prejudice if the matter was not dealt with urgently

The application for urgent relief was dismissed as the matter was found not to be urgent and should join the ordinary roll of cases.

For a matter to be heard on an urgent basis under Rule 244 of the High Court Rules: (1) the applicant must demonstrate on their own part that they treated the matter as urgent by acting immediately without inordinate delay; (2) the applicant must show there is no other satisfactory alternative remedy available; and (3) the applicant must demonstrate that irreparable prejudice (not merely foreseeable financial prejudice) will result if the matter is not dealt with urgently. Failure to satisfy these requirements means the matter is not urgent and must join the ordinary court roll. Self-created urgency will not be accepted by the court.

The court noted that by exercising their right under the Labour Act through filing a show cause order, the applicants effectively conceded the existence of an alternative remedy. The court also observed that financial prejudice resulting from lawful collective job action is foreseeable and does not constitute the type of irreparable harm contemplated by the rules governing urgent applications. The court refused to consider explanations for delay offered by counsel from the bar, emphasizing that such explanations must be contained in the affidavits before the court.

This case illustrates the strict approach Zimbabwean courts take to applications for urgent relief in labour disputes. It reinforces the principle that urgency is not established merely by the nature of the dispute (collective job action) but requires the applicant to demonstrate they acted promptly, have no alternative remedy, and will suffer irreparable (not merely financial) harm. The case is significant for emphasizing that self-created urgency will not be countenanced by the courts, and that the existence of statutory remedies (such as show cause orders under the Labour Act) undermines claims that urgent court intervention is necessary.