After holding consultative discussions with the applicant and other stakeholders, the second respondent (Ministry of Transport) enacted the Road Traffic (Construction and Equipment Use) Regulations 2010 (Statutory Instrument 154 of 2010) which banned the importation and phased out heavy left-hand drive motor vehicles in Zimbabwe on road safety grounds. The regulations were purportedly enacted in terms of section 81 of the Road Traffic Act [Cap 13:11]. The applicant, representing transport operators, challenged the legality of the regulations, arguing that they were improperly enacted by the Ministry rather than the Minister, and that section 10(2) of the Regulations exceeded the powers conferred by the enabling Act.
The court declared by way of declaratur that the Road Traffic (Construction and Equipment Use) Regulations 2010 (Statutory Instrument 154 of 2010) and the amendments thereto were invalid, null and void. The first and second respondents were ordered to pay costs of suit, jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved.
1. Subsidiary legislation that purports to impose a wholesale prohibition beyond the limited scope authorized by the enabling Act is ultra vires and invalid. Where an enabling Act limits the Minister's power to prohibit only vehicles lacking proper signaling apparatus, the Minister cannot impose a blanket ban on all left-hand drive vehicles. 2. Regulations made by a Ministry rather than the Minister, where the enabling statute specifically confers regulation-making power on the Minister, are ultra vires the enabling Act and void ab initio. 'Minister' and 'Ministry' are distinct legal entities and cannot be used interchangeably. 3. Where legislation confers a discretionary power on the holder of an office, that power must be exercised by that office-holder personally and cannot be vicariously discharged by another entity. 4. An act that is ultra vires is a nullity - automatically null and void without need for a court order, though declaratory relief may be granted. Any proceedings founded on a void act are also incurably bad.
The court observed that the application ought not to have been opposed in the first place, describing the opposition as 'misplaced adventurism' on the part of the respondents. Bere J stated that this was 'one rare case where one has to fight hard to avoid taking the initiative to grant costs on Attorney-client scale,' suggesting the opposition was so clearly without merit that punitive costs were considered. The court also commented that alleging 'there was a mistake' without supporting evidence in motion proceedings was 'the lazy way out of trouble' confirming the absence of a bona fide defense. The court noted that the respondents' notices of opposition were poorly drafted, evidently duplicated, and amounted to no more than bare denials.
This case establishes important principles in Zimbabwean administrative law regarding the proper exercise of delegated legislative powers. It reinforces that subsidiary legislation must be enacted by the specific entity authorized by the enabling statute, and that 'Minister' and 'Ministry' are legally distinct entities that cannot be substituted for one another. The case affirms that regulations enacted by an unauthorized body are void ab initio (from the beginning) and need no court order to set them aside, though declaratory relief is appropriate. It also establishes that delegated powers must be exercised within the strict confines set by the legislature, and cannot be used to override, alter, add to or subtract from Parliament's express intentions. The judgment demonstrates the courts' role in reviewing administrative action to ensure compliance with enabling legislation and the principle that discretionary powers vested in a particular office-holder cannot be vicariously exercised.