Tobias Zangairai and Lioba Vimbai Zangairai v Prosecutor General N.O and Others

On 27 January 2023, the High Court granted an ex parte application for an unexplained wealth order combined with an interim freezing order in case number HACC 01/23 at the instance of the Prosecutor General. The order required the applicant to provide a sworn statement explaining how he acquired twenty-four properties listed in the order within thirty days, and froze any dealings in those properties. The applicant complied with the order and delivered his sworn statement within the prescribed period. However, for more than two and half years thereafter, the Prosecutor General took no further action - neither filing an application for civil forfeiture of the properties, nor instituting criminal prosecution of the applicant, nor communicating with the applicant regarding intentions concerning the properties. The applicant then brought two applications: HCHACC 11/25 (filed 18 February 2025) seeking to set aside the interim freezing order in terms of s 37J(2) of the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act, and HCHACC 130/24 (filed 7 August 2024) seeking discharge of the same order in respect of some properties in terms of s 37J(1) and (3) of the same Act.

• Whether the applicant established 'good cause' for the setting aside of the interim freezing order under s 37J(2) of the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act [Chapter 9:24]
• What constitutes 'good cause' for purposes of setting aside an interim freezing order
• Whether an interim freezing order can remain in force indefinitely without further action by the Prosecutor General
• Whether the continued freezing order violated the applicant's constitutional property rights under s 71(2) of the Constitution

1. The application was granted. 2. The interim freezing order granted under case number HACC 01/23 was set aside. 3. The applicant was allowed to deal in all twenty-four properties listed (including nine pieces of land/stands and fifteen vehicles). 4. Case Number HCHACC 130/24 was struck out. 5. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs in respect of both case numbers HCHACC 11/25 and HCHACC 130/24.

An interim freezing order under the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act [Chapter 9:24] is not intended to remain in force in perpetuity. 'Good cause' for setting aside such an order under s 37J(2) of the Act means 'sufficient' or 'satisfactory' grounds, to be determined by the court in its discretion based on the facts and circumstances. Where the Prosecutor General obtains an interim freezing order combined with an unexplained wealth order but fails to take any further action (such as filing an application for civil forfeiture or instituting criminal prosecution) for an extended period (over two and half years), this constitutes good cause for setting aside the interim freezing order. The legislative intention behind interim freezing orders when conjoined to unexplained wealth orders is to avoid dissipation of properties for a reasonable period to afford the Prosecutor General an opportunity to take further action, not to curtail constitutional property rights indefinitely. Failure to take advantage of the order by progressing the matter justifies setting aside the order to restore the property owner's constitutional rights under s 71(2) of the Constitution.

The court observed that the first respondent's counsel, Mr Mufute, acted properly in conceding that there was no evidence of any action taken by the Prosecutor General after the granting of the interim freezing order. The court noted that property owners have constitutional rights under s 71(2) to acquire, hold, occupy, use, transfer, hypothecate, lease or dispose of property, and these are the rights that the applicant had been unable to exercise for more than two and half years. The court commented that it was not surprising that counsel for the first respondent was unable to make any meaningful submissions in opposition to the application given the complete lack of action by the Prosecutor General over the extended period.

This case establishes important principles regarding the limitations on interim freezing orders under the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act in Zimbabwean law. It clarifies that such orders are not intended to be permanent and that the prosecution must take timely action to either proceed with civil forfeiture applications or criminal prosecution. The judgment reinforces constitutional property rights under s 71(2) of the Constitution and establishes that prolonged inaction by the Prosecutor General (over two and half years in this case) constitutes good cause for setting aside an interim freezing order. It provides important guidance on the balance between asset preservation for potential forfeiture and the protection of property rights, establishing that the State cannot indefinitely curtail property rights through interim orders without progressing the underlying matter.