The applicant sought an urgent chamber application for a provisional order staying execution of two arbitral awards rendered by arbitrator Mr R Charindeguta in favour of the first and second respondents on 21 June 2013. The awards had been registered with the Magistrates' Court. The applicant had appealed to the Labour Court against the arbitral awards. When the first and second respondents proceeded with execution of the registered award, the applicant made an application to the Labour Court for stay of execution. On 11 September 2013, the Labour Court dismissed that application on the basis that it was not urgent. The applicant then instituted the current application on 6 June 2014, almost nine months after the Labour Court's dismissal, seeking to stay execution of the awards.
The application was struck off the roll of urgent matters. The applicant was ordered to pay the costs.
An application is not urgent where the applicant has failed to act timeously to protect its rights and the urgency has been self-created through delay. A party seeking urgent relief must demonstrate that the matter cannot wait to be resolved through ordinary court processes. Where an applicant waits approximately nine months after an adverse ruling without taking any action to challenge that ruling or institute ordinary proceedings, and then seeks urgent relief, such urgency is self-created and does not warrant preferential treatment through the urgent court roll. An applicant's subjective belief about the legal position does not excuse failure to act with appropriate urgency, particularly where the applicant was aware that execution would proceed.
The court cited with approval the principle from Gillespie J in Dilwin Investments that a party bringing urgent proceedings gains a considerable advantage over other litigants whose disputes are dealt with in the normal course, and that such preferential treatment is only warranted where good cause is shown for treating one litigant differently from most litigants. This reinforces the policy consideration that the urgent roll is a privilege, not a right, and must be reserved for genuinely urgent matters to preserve the integrity of the court system and fairness to other litigants.
This case reinforces the principles governing urgent applications in Zimbabwean courts. It demonstrates that courts will strictly scrutinize claims of urgency and will not allow applicants to gain preferential treatment through urgent proceedings where they have created their own urgency through delay or inaction. The case emphasizes that urgency must be objectively established and cannot be manufactured by waiting until the last moment to act, particularly where an applicant has already had previous opportunities to address the matter and failed to take timely action.