The applicant was convicted of robbery by a Regional Magistrate sitting at Chinhoyi and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment (with 2 years suspended for good behaviour and 18 months suspended on condition of restitution). The robbery occurred on 13 February 2019 at Murombedzi Growth Point. The complainant, who worked for a company licensed to buy gold, had been contacted by one Chanakira about a gold sale. The applicant, introduced as Chanakira's uncle "Hamandishe", met the complainant to complete the transaction. After driving to a location outside Murombedzi, gold weighing 373.9 grams was weighed. The complainant handed over US$15,000 to the applicant. According to the State, when the complainant was about to hand over an additional bundle to make up US$15,960, the applicant produced a firearm, demanded the bundle and the return of the gold, and ordered the complainant to drive away under threat of death. The applicant's version was that he sold 302 grams of gold for US$9,060, with the complainant promising to pay for the remaining 151 grams the next day, but the complainant became evasive claiming the gold was fake. The applicant denied robbing the complainant. After conviction and sentence, the applicant filed a Notice of Appeal against both conviction and sentence, and subsequently applied for bail pending appeal.
The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.
After conviction, an applicant for bail pending appeal does not enjoy the presumption of innocence and bears the onus of showing why bail should be granted. The factors to be considered are: (i) likelihood of abscondment; (ii) prospects of success on appeal; (iii) right to individual liberty; and (iv) potential delay before appeal is heard. Dim prospects of success on appeal, combined with the likelihood of abscondment given a substantial custodial sentence, warrant refusal of bail pending appeal. The right to bail after conviction is not a fundamental human right guaranteed by the Constitution but derives from statute (Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act). Where there are no positive grounds for granting bail, it is generally refused, and the greater the sentence imposed, the greater must be the prospects of success before bail should be granted.
The court observed that the introduction of High Court sittings not only in Harare and Bulawayo but also in Mutare and Masvingo has shortened the period an applicant has to wait for an appeal to be heard, thus reducing the weight to be given to delay as a factor favouring bail. The court also commented that Chanakira (who introduced the parties) may not have been entirely innocent and this may explain why he was not called as a State witness. The court noted that while there were differences in the amounts described by the complainant and applicant regarding the value of gold, this was "but one of the many factors to be considered in the full circumstances of this case" at the appeal stage. The court suggested that the defence version that the complainant was being malicious to avoid paying for the rest of the gold was "feebly put" and if it was the bedrock of the defence, there would have been sustained cross-examination on this issue.
This case illustrates the application of established principles governing bail pending appeal in Zimbabwean criminal law. It emphasizes that after conviction, the presumption of innocence no longer applies and the onus shifts to the convicted person to show why bail should be granted. The case demonstrates that prospects of success on appeal must be strong to warrant bail, and courts will not grant bail based on minor or technical grounds of appeal. It also reinforces that robbery is a serious offence for which custodial sentences are appropriate and that alternatives such as fines or community service are generally inappropriate for such serious crimes involving substantial values. The judgment provides guidance on assessing the likelihood of abscondment in relation to the length of sentence imposed. Note: This is a Zimbabwean High Court decision, not a South African case, though both jurisdictions share similar common law heritage and bail principles.