In October 2017, the applicant, a 35-year-old male commuter omnibus driver, was transporting school children from school to home. The complainant, a 7-year-old girl, was one of his passengers. It is alleged that after dropping off other children, the applicant told the complainant not to disembark. He then drove her to a nearby bush area, moved to the back passenger seat where she was seated, pulled up her uniform, removed her pants and raped her. After the rape, he wiped bloodstains off the seat and instructed her not to report the incident. Later, when the complainant's mother was bathing her, she noticed irregularities with the child's private parts. Upon questioning, the complainant disclosed what had happened. A police report was made leading to the applicant's arrest. The applicant was charged with rape in terms of section 65 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23]. The applicant denied the allegations and claimed he had never been alone with the complainant, though he admitted knowing her as a pupil he used to transport.
The bail application was dismissed. The applicant was to remain in custody pending trial.
In determining whether to grant bail under section 117, the 'interests of justice' test must be measured within the confines of peremptory constitutional provisions and cannot be evaluated solely on the interests or rights of the applicant alone. Courts must apply section 46 of the Constitution to give full effect to all rights and freedoms in the Declaration of Rights, and section 86(1) requiring rights to be exercised reasonably with due regard for others' rights. Where a bail application involves a child victim, the constitutional provisions of section 81 apply, requiring that: (1) a child's best interests are paramount in every matter concerning the child (section 81(2)); and (2) the High Court must provide adequate protection to children as their upper guardian (section 81(3)). Bail may be denied where granting it would undermine or jeopardize the objectives or proper functioning of the criminal justice system under section 117(2)(iii) and (iv), particularly in Third Schedule offences that are serious and rampant. In assessing risk of witness interference with child complainants, courts must consider the likelihood of intimidation and whether proposed bail conditions would adequately protect the child, taking into account factors such as the size of the community and proximity of accused to the victim.
The court observed that rape cases are rampant to the extent that courts are enjoined to include the perceptions of the public of the judicial system in considering whether there is a properly functional judicial system. The court noted that prohibiting the applicant from driving his commuter omnibus, as suggested by the applicant's counsel, would not in itself reduce the risk of the complainant being intimidated and ultimately adversely influenced. The court also commented that Beitbridge is a small community, which supported the respondent's concerns about the risk of interference with the child if the applicant remained at the same residence.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean jurisprudence for demonstrating how courts must balance competing constitutional rights in bail applications involving serious offences against children. It establishes that the constitutional imperative that a child's best interests are paramount (section 81(2)) and the court's role as upper guardian of minors (section 81(3)) are central considerations in bail proceedings involving child victims. The case illustrates the proper application of the constitutional framework in interpreting the 'interests of justice' test under section 117 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, showing that bail determinations must consider not only the accused's rights but also the constitutional rights of victims, particularly vulnerable child witnesses. It recognizes that in small communities, the risk of witness intimidation is heightened and that simple conditions of bail may be insufficient to protect child complainants from intimidation and interference.