Both respondents were employees of Century Discount House Limited and were authorised signatories for the company. On 29 December 2003, in the course of their employment, they issued and signed a cheque in the applicant's name for $757,024,582.47. When signing the cheque, the respondents did not use recognized symbols such as "p.p" or "for" to indicate they were signing in a representative capacity. Century Discount House Limited was subsequently placed under provisional liquidation and the cheque was dishonoured upon presentation. However, the cheque bore the company's name and bank account number on its face. The applicant sued both respondents in their personal capacities for the dishonoured amount.
The application for summary judgment was dismissed with costs.
Personal liability under section 25(1) of the Bills of Exchange Act [Chapter 14:02] need not be expressly excluded through qualifying words on the signature. Liability may be excluded by inference upon a careful examination of the totality of the disputed instrument. Where a cheque bears the company's name and bank account number on its face, this raises a triable issue as to whether the signatories signed in a representative capacity, sufficient to defeat an application for summary judgment. Summary judgment should only be granted in clearly unanswerable cases where the defendant has no valid defence on the merits.
The court expressed the view that there is a need in the jurisdiction for a careful reassessment and authoritative pronouncement of the legal effect of the "universal rule" regarding personal liability on bills of exchange and a proper interpretation of section 25 of the Bills of Exchange Act in relation to technological developments and the common intention of the parties. The judge noted that Lord Ellenborough's dictum in Leadbitter v Farrow related to a primitive era more than 200 years ago when computer generation of bills of exchange and electronic banking were unheard of, and questioned whether it continues to stand the test of time. The court observed that consensus is of the essence of contract and that contracts ought to be interpreted with a view to giving effect to the common intention of the parties.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean commercial law as it signals a judicial willingness to reconsider the strict application of the traditional "universal rule" regarding personal liability on bills of exchange in light of modern technological developments. The judgment recognizes that computer-generated cheques bearing company names and account numbers may constitute sufficient indication of representative capacity, even without express qualifying words like "p.p" or "for". The case calls for a reassessment of the legal effect of the traditional rule and proper interpretation of section 25 of the Bills of Exchange Act in relation to technological developments and the common intention of parties. It demonstrates judicial recognition that the law must evolve to keep pace with changes in commercial practice and technology.