The State v Tranos Mashoko

On 20 October 2003, the deceased Arthur Joel Mpofu, a 21-year-old known mental patient, visited various homesteads in Village 5, Mancott Resettlement area, Inyathi, where he engaged in disruptive behavior. At Kesari Khumalo's homestead, he was locked in a kitchen hut by Tinos Dube but broke out with an axe and fled. Tinos Dube and Nkosilathi Siziba, armed with a knobkerrie and wire sling respectively, tracked the deceased and encountered him in the company of the accused who was carrying a sjambok. The trio took turns assaulting the deceased all over his body - Tinos Dube with a knobkerrie until it broke, the accused with a sjambok, and Nkosilathi with a wire sling. The deceased sustained serious injuries and was found dead on a road the following day at around 1500 hours. A post-mortem examination revealed the cause of death as subarachnoid haemorrhage due to multiple assaults, with the pathologist noting that severe force was used.

• Whether the accused was guilty of murder or the lesser charge of culpable homicide
• Whether the accused intended to cause the death of the deceased
• What constitutes a reasonable time for trial under section 69 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No. 20 of 2013
• What is an appropriate sentence considering the 15-year delay between the commission of the offence and the trial

The accused was found not guilty and acquitted on the charge of murder. The accused was convicted of culpable homicide and sentenced to 3 years imprisonment, wholly suspended for 5 years on condition that the accused is not convicted within that period of an offence involving violence for which he is sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a fine.

Where an accused person's constitutional right to a fair trial within a reasonable time under section 69 of the Constitution has been violated due to an inordinate delay (15 years) attributable to the state's failure to bring the accused to trial, and where the accused has been available and has not impeded proceedings, it would be unjust to impose a custodial sentence. The court must balance the interests of justice with the accused's rights, and in such circumstances, a wholly suspended sentence may be appropriate notwithstanding that the offence of culpable homicide involved severe violence resulting in death.

The court observed that nothing would be served by sending the accused to prison after such a lengthy delay, noting that if he had been tried within a reasonable time, he would have long since served any sentence imposed. The court remarked that it is not acceptable for an accused person's constitutional right to a speedy trial to be violated for any reason whatsoever, and that the state should have prosecuted the accused long ago rather than waiting to secure the attendance of co-accused persons who remained at large. The court also noted the accused had matured from age 26 to 41 during the delay period.

This case is significant in Zimbabwean criminal jurisprudence for its application of the constitutional right to a speedy trial under section 69 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No. 20 of 2013. It demonstrates that inordinate delays in prosecution (15 years in this case) can be a significant mitigating factor in sentencing, particularly where the delay is attributable to the state rather than the accused. The case emphasizes that constitutional rights must be protected and that delays cannot be excused merely because co-accused persons remain at large. It also illustrates the distinction between murder and culpable homicide where there is no evidence of intention to kill, even in cases involving severe violence resulting in death.