The State v Tineyi Magedhe

On 19 February 2013 at Village Nyoka, Chief Chiwundura, Gweru in the Midlands Province, the accused (aged 32 years) and the deceased Emily Dukwende were both employed as domestic workers by Dani William Nyoka and were left alone at the homestead. The accused approached the deceased while she was cleaning the house and demanded to have sexual intercourse with her. When she refused, the accused became infuriated and struck her four times on the back of the head with an axe handle (weighing 0.88kg, 80cm long, 13.5cm circumference). The deceased fell down bleeding profusely and became unconscious. The accused then forcibly had sexual intercourse with the unconscious deceased, dragged her body into the house, and fled the scene. He later surrendered himself to police and admitted the offence. The post mortem report indicated death was caused by subarachnoid haemorrhage due to blunt force trauma. The accused had a history of mental illness dating back to 1998, including auditory hallucinations, strange behavior, emotional withdrawal, and a previous attempt to kill his first wife in 2005.

• Whether the accused was criminally responsible for causing the death of the deceased
• Whether the accused was suffering from mental illness at the time of the offence to such an extent that he could not be held criminally responsible for his conduct
• Whether a special verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity should be entered

The court ordered: (1) Accused is found not guilty by reason of insanity. (2) In terms of section 29 of the Mental Health Act [Chapter 15:12] accused is to be returned to prison for transfer to a Mental Institution for further treatment and care.

Where there is sufficient evidence that an accused person was suffering from a mental disorder (such as schizophrenia) at the time of committing an offence, to such an extent that he could not be held criminally responsible for his conduct, the court must return a special verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. In such circumstances, the appropriate course is to commit the accused to a mental institution for treatment and care under section 29 of the Mental Health Act [Chapter 15:12], rather than to impose criminal punishment. Psychiatric evidence establishing a long history of mental illness, auditory hallucinations, and disturbed behavior is sufficient to ground a finding that the accused lacked criminal capacity at the time of the offence.

The court noted that the accused had a long history of mental illness dating back to 1998 and had previously attempted to kill his first wife in 2005 (though she escaped). The court also observed that the accused had sought treatment from a Madzibaba Apostolic Church in 2012, suggesting recognition by the accused or his family of his mental health issues. The psychiatrist's conclusion that the accused is dangerous to society underscores the importance of continued institutional care and treatment rather than release into the community.

This case demonstrates the application of the mental illness defence in Zimbabwe criminal law, particularly in serious cases involving murder. It illustrates the court's approach to determining criminal responsibility where psychiatric evidence establishes that an accused suffered from a severe mental disorder (schizophrenia) at the time of the offence. The case affirms that where mental illness is established to the requisite degree, the accused cannot be held criminally responsible regardless of the gravity of the offence. It also demonstrates the procedural requirements for dealing with such cases, including psychiatric observation and examination, and the court's power under section 29 of the Mental Health Act to commit the accused to a mental institution for treatment rather than imposing criminal punishment.