The accused, aged 18, was convicted of theft in contravention of section 113 of the Criminal Code (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23]. He had snatched a bag from the complainant containing $100.00. Both the bag and money were recovered. The trial magistrate sentenced him to a fine of $150.00 and in default 30 days imprisonment, plus an additional 30 days imprisonment suspended for three years on the usual conditions. The Acting Regional Magistrate questioned the competency of the sentence, suggesting that the fine should have been at least twice the value of the stolen property ($200.00), not $150.00, based on a reading of section 113(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.
The trial magistrate's sentence was confirmed as correct and competent.
The binding legal principle is that section 113(1)(b) of the Criminal Code (Codification and Reform) Act permits a court to impose any fine between level one ($5.00) and level fourteen ($5000.00) for theft. The provision "a fine not exceeding level fourteen or twice the value of the stolen property, whichever is the greater" establishes maximum thresholds, not minimum fines. The reference to twice the value of stolen property is an alternative method of calculating the maximum permissible fine in cases warranting the highest penalty, and applies only where twice the value exceeds the level fourteen fine. There is no requirement that fines in theft cases must be at least twice the value of the stolen property.
The court provided an illustrative example: if X steals property worth $2600.00 and the magistrate determines that a maximum fine is warranted, a level fourteen fine would be $5000.00 whereas twice the value would be $5200.00. In such a case, $5200.00 would be the imposable maximum fine as it is greater than the level fourteen fine. The court also observed that the trial magistrate appropriately considered the youthful age of the offender (18 years) in determining that the fine was appropriate to the circumstances.
This case provides authoritative guidance on the interpretation of section 113(1)(b) of the Criminal Code (Codification and Reform) Act regarding sentencing for theft in Zimbabwe. It clarifies a common misunderstanding among magistrates about the application of fines in theft cases, establishing that the "twice the value of stolen property" provision sets a maximum threshold for serious cases, not a minimum fine requirement. The judgment emphasizes judicial discretion in sentencing within the prescribed levels and corrects an overly restrictive interpretation that could have led to disproportionate sentences in minor theft cases.