The State v Tafirei Runesu

On 16 August 2016, the accused struck and killed the deceased with a log, causing massive head injury and intracranial bleeding. The deceased, the accused's brother-in-law, had initiated an earlier fight at a beer drink. After being separated, the deceased returned armed with a flick knife (24 cm long, blade 11.2 cm) and pursued the accused. The deceased entered the accused's homestead and chased him around the property - through the kitchen hut, around the bedroom hut, around a scotch-cart twice, and eventually outside the homestead to a goat-pen. During the pursuit, the deceased thrust the knife at the accused three times, the third thrust tearing the accused's shirt. After running around the goat-pen twice more, the accused picked up a log (1.56 metres long, 1.815 kg) and, when the deceased caught up with him, struck him once on the head. The deceased fell and died. The accused then walked to the police station to report the incident. The deceased's wife Jennifer witnessed portions of the incident from outside the homestead fence.

• Whether the accused acted in lawful self-defence when he killed the deceased
• Whether all requirements of self-defence under section 253(1) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act were satisfied
• Whether the accused had a duty to continue retreating rather than using deadly force
• Whether the means used to avert the unlawful attack were reasonable in all circumstances
• Whether the harm caused was grossly disproportionate to that liable to be caused by the unlawful attack

The accused was found not guilty of murder and discharged.

A person acting in self-defence is not obliged to continue retreating indefinitely when faced with a relentless unlawful attack with a deadly weapon. The duty to retreat under section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act must be assessed contextually, taking into account: (1) the accused's subjective belief, on reasonable grounds, that he could not otherwise escape; (2) the prolonged and persistent nature of the attack; (3) previous unsuccessful attempts to flee; (4) the accused's state of exhaustion, stress and fear as required by section 253(2); and (5) whether continued retreat would expose the accused to equal or greater danger. Courts must not apply impossibly high standards or engage in detached intellectual analysis divorced from the emergency circumstances. Where an accused has made repeated efforts to escape and avoid confrontation, and the aggressor remains undeterred and armed with a deadly weapon, the use of lethal force in self-defence may be lawful even if theoretical avenues of further retreat existed.

The court observed that 'armchair criticism of an accused's reaction many days, or weeks, or months or even years after the event, and in the comfort of the court-room, and which ignores the exigencies of the occasion, is to be avoided.' The court noted that in applying self-defence requirements, courts adopt a robust attitude and 'do not seek to measure with nice intellectual callipers the precise bounds of legitimate self-defence.' The judgment also commented that the law does not demand 'detached reflection in the face of an up-lifted knife' and that a person is not obliged to 'gamble with his life by exposing himself to the risk of a stab in the back.' The court made general observations about the social contract whereby the State protects citizens from unlawful attacks in exchange for citizens refraining from private vengeance, but acknowledged that complete state protection at all times is impossible, necessitating allowance for self-defence. The court also noted, without condemning her, that the deceased's wife's evidence showed understandable 'self-interest' in seeking 'retributive justice.'

This case provides important guidance on the application of Zimbabwe's statutory self-defence provisions under section 253 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act. It emphasizes that courts must adopt a robust, contextual approach when assessing whether an accused person could have retreated rather than using deadly force. The judgment reinforces that the duty to retreat is not absolute and must be assessed in light of the accused's subjective state of mind, the prolonged nature of the attack, previous failed attempts to escape, and the real and immediate danger faced. It cautions against armchair criticism with the benefit of hindsight and establishes that the law does not set impossible standards of behavior in life-threatening emergencies. The case is particularly significant for its application of section 253(2), which requires consideration of stress, fear, and the accused's circumstances when determining whether self-defence requirements are satisfied.