The State v Precious Hamandishe

The accused, aged 29, was married to George Runesu (Junior) in January 2015 and brought her 2½-year-old child, Tadiwa Mangoma (the deceased), to live with them. The accused's in-laws were uncomfortable with the deceased living with them and advised her to surrender custody to the child's father. When this proved unsuccessful and her own mother also rejected the child, the accused strangled the deceased using bark fiber from a tree while walking back to her husband's village. The deceased's body was discovered on 18 January 2015 in a highly decomposed state. The accused had multiple prior relationships and children with different men. After killing the child, she returned to live with George Runesu (Junior).

• Whether the accused caused the death of the deceased with actual intent to kill
• Whether the defence of diminished responsibility was available to the accused under section 218(2) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act
• Whether the accused's claim of mercy killing could be sustained
• What constitutes an appropriate sentence for a female first offender convicted of murder with actual intent

The accused was found guilty of murder with actual intent and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment, of which 3 years was suspended for 5 years on condition that she not be convicted of an offence involving violence during that period. Effective sentence: 7 years imprisonment.

The binding legal principles established are: (1) For murder with actual intent, the court must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused desired to bring about the victim's death or foresaw death as substantially certain and proceeded regardless; (2) The defence of diminished responsibility under section 218(2) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act is unavailable where acute mental or emotional stress is brought about through the accused's own fault; (3) Medical reports suggesting diminished responsibility must be supported by other evidence and are not conclusive - the determination is for the court to make, not medical experts; (4) Premeditation and planning in the execution of a killing are indicative of actual intent to kill; (5) Claims of mercy killing require medical evidence demonstrating the victim suffered from a terminal illness causing unbearable pain with no prospect of relief.

The court observed that diminished responsibility, even if established, would be sufficient only to establish extenuating circumstances and would not preclude a verdict of murder with actual intent (citing S v Chinono 1990 (1) ZLR 244 (H)). The court commented that the accused's conduct demonstrated she chose to save her marriage over her child's life, noting that she was residing at the Runesu homestead upon arrest. The court also made observations about the accused's pattern of entering multiple relationships in a short period and giving away children to pursue new relationships, characterizing her conduct as demonstrating "loose moral tendencies." The judgment notes that section 48(2)(d) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe No. 20 (2013) specifically prohibits the imposition of capital punishment on female offenders, and that female first offenders are to be treated with leniency as an established sentencing principle.

This case clarifies the application of the defence of diminished responsibility under section 218(2) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act, particularly that the defence is unavailable where the accused's emotional stress results from their own fault or conscious decisions. The case also demonstrates the court's approach to distinguishing genuine mercy killing cases (where a child suffers from a proven terminal illness causing unbearable pain) from cases where an accused claims mercy killing without supporting medical evidence. The judgment illustrates the sentencing approach for female first offenders convicted of murder, balancing constitutional prohibitions on capital punishment for women with the seriousness of the offence and the principle that medical reports suggesting diminished responsibility must be supported by other evidence and are not conclusive on their own.