On 10 May 2019, at Limon Ncube's homestead, Sikhamaswe Village, Sun Yet Sen, the accused (aged 25) and the deceased Liaza Ndlovu (aged 21), who were husband and wife, had a domestic dispute. The accused discovered a message on the deceased's cell phone which he could not read as he was illiterate. He suspected it was from the deceased's boyfriend and refused to return the phone. Later in the kitchen, the accused tripped the deceased and she fell to the ground. The accused armed himself with a kitchen knife and a struggle ensued, resulting in him stabbing the deceased once on the chest, once on the right palm, and once on the right side of the neck. The accused then attempted to commit suicide by stabbing himself in the stomach. Both were taken to Sun Yet Sen Police where the deceased filed a domestic violence report, then referred to Tshelanyemba Hospital and subsequently to Maphisa District Hospital. The deceased was further referred to United Bulawayo Hospital where her condition worsened and she died on 12 May 2019. The post mortem report determined the cause of death as haemorrhage shock, perforated right ventricle heart, stab wound left, and assault.
1. The accused is found not guilty and acquitted by reason of insanity. 2. The accused is hereby returned to prison pending transfer to Mlondolozi Special Institution for further examination and treatment in terms of section 29(2)(a) of the Mental Health Act (Chapter 15:23).
Where an accused person commits an act constituting an offence but at the time of commission was suffering from a mental disorder such that they did not appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions, the court must return a special verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity in terms of section 29(2)(a) of the Mental Health Act (Chapter 15:23). Mental disorder, supported by medical and psychiatric evidence, negates criminal responsibility even where the actus reus and physical causation of death are established beyond reasonable doubt.
The court noted that while the accused was mentally disordered at the time of the offence (suffering from Temporal Lobe Epilepsy), he was fit to stand trial at the time of the proceedings. This demonstrates that mental state at the time of the offence and fitness to stand trial are distinct legal concepts that must be assessed separately. The court also observed that the case involved a domestic violence context, with the deceased having filed a domestic violence report before her death, though this did not affect the ultimate determination of the accused's criminal liability given his mental state.
This case demonstrates the application of section 29(2)(a) of the Mental Health Act (Chapter 15:23) in Zimbabwe, which provides for a special verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity where an accused person was suffering from a mental disorder at the time of committing the offence such that they could not appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions. The case illustrates the importance of psychiatric evidence in determining criminal liability and the court's approach to balancing the need for public protection with the recognition that mentally disordered persons should not be held criminally responsible for acts committed while incapacitated. It also shows the procedural pathway for managing accused persons found not guilty by reason of insanity, including their detention and transfer to special institutions for treatment.