The State v Macheka Shangwa and Wellington Shangwa

The two accused persons, Macheka Shangwa (accused 1) and Wellington Shangwa (accused 2), were blood brothers, and the deceased Trust Chidhume was their cousin. On 25 December 2009, accused 2 had a misunderstanding with the deceased who, together with Sanangurai Chidhume, chastised accused 2 for fighting. Displeased, accused 2 went home to fetch accused 1, threatening to return for revenge. Both accused returned to the scene. Accused 1 had armed himself with a screwdriver. Upon arrival, accused 1 assaulted Mufaro Chidhume who fled, then assaulted Sanangurai rendering him unconscious, and finally stabbed the deceased with the screwdriver. The deceased sustained multiple stab wounds to the anterior and lateral sides of the chest and back, leading to bilateral pneumothorax and death. The screwdriver weighed 8 grams with a 10 cm blade. Both accused had consumed alcohol. Post-incident, the accused families contributed eleven of fifteen beasts required traditionally and contributed to funeral expenses.

• Whether accused 1 should be convicted of murder with actual intent or culpable homicide
• Whether the defence of self-defence was available to accused 1
• Whether accused 2 could be convicted of culpable homicide under the doctrine of common purpose despite not participating in the actual stabbing
• What degree of participation and foreseeability is required for liability under common purpose
• Whether accused 2's role in instigating the events was sufficient for criminal liability

Accused 1: Not guilty of murder but guilty of culpable homicide. Sentenced to ten years imprisonment of which two years suspended for five years on condition of no further violent offences. Accused 2: Not guilty of murder but guilty of culpable homicide. Sentenced to ten years imprisonment of which two years suspended for five years on condition of no further violent offences.

Under the doctrine of common purpose, an accused can be convicted of culpable homicide where: (1) he initiated and masterminded a revenge attack; (2) he associated himself with the conduct of his co-accused by participating in the dangerous venture; (3) as a reasonable person (bona paterfamilias), he should have foreseen that in meting out revenge, the victim might be seriously injured; and (4) he failed to take steps to ensure the punishment did not exceed accepted levels. The instigator's negligence in encouraging and participating in an extremely dangerous adventure is sufficient for liability even without direct participation in the fatal act or knowledge of the specific weapon used. A person armed with a dangerous weapon who uses it to inflict fatal injuries acts negligently where the evidence does not establish actual intent beyond reasonable doubt but shows he should have appreciated the consequences of his conduct.

The court observed that murder by its nature creates a permanent stigma on the accused who will always be remembered for cutting short the deceased's life. The court emphasized that human life must be respected because it is irreplaceable, and no amount of punishment can adequately recompense a death. The court noted that conflicts in society must be resolved in civilized fashion through intervention of family elders, particularly when parties have sobered up, rather than through barbaric vigilante behavior. The court commented that alcohol consumption clouded the accused persons' ability to think rationally. The court also noted that the deceased lost his life for doing nothing except exercising his natural and brotherly authority, which was aggravating. Post-crime traditional reconciliation efforts and contributions to funeral expenses were recognized as demonstrating some remorse.

This is a Zimbabwean High Court case, not a South African case. However, it demonstrates the application of the doctrine of common purpose in homicide cases, particularly where one party instigates violence without directly participating in the fatal act. The case illustrates that an instigator can be held liable for culpable homicide where he should have foreseen that serious injury or death might result from the planned revenge attack, even without knowledge of the specific weapon or direct participation in the fatal assault. The judgment emphasizes that conflicts must be resolved through civilized means rather than vigilante justice, and that human life is sacred and irreplaceable. It also demonstrates judicial discretion in rejecting both the accused's preferred plea and the State's preferred verdict in favor of an intermediate finding.