The State v Lovemore Jochoma

The accused was observed by a security guard at Chitungwiza Magistrates Court breaking an egg at the court gate on 25 March 2014 at around 6 am. When confronted, he ran away. The following morning at around the same time, he was again observed attempting to break another egg at the same gate. When confronted he fled but was pursued and apprehended. Upon being searched he was found in possession of red and white cloths. He was charged with engaging in a practice commonly associated with witchcraft in contravention of section 98(1) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act. He pleaded guilty to the charge and admitted all the facts and essential elements of the offence, stating that his intention was to cause harm to persons at the premises and to defeat the course of justice. The trial magistrate convicted him and sentenced him to 12 months imprisonment of which 3 months was suspended for 5 years on conditions of good behaviour, resulting in an effective 9 months imprisonment.

• Whether a conviction based on a plea of guilty to engaging in practices commonly associated with witchcraft is competent without expert evidence
• Whether section 98(4) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act, which prohibits judicial notice of practices associated with witchcraft, precludes conviction on an accused's own plea of guilty
• Whether admitted facts require proof through expert evidence
• Whether the sentence imposed was appropriate

The proceedings were confirmed as being in accordance with real and substantial justice. Both the conviction and the sentence of 9 months effective imprisonment were upheld on review.

Section 98(4) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act, which prohibits courts from taking judicial notice of practices commonly associated with witchcraft without expert evidence, does not preclude conviction based on an accused person's admission of facts. What is admitted need not be proved, and an admission constitutes sufficient evidence of the admitted fact under section 314 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. Section 271(1) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act permits conviction on a plea of guilty without hearing evidence, except in murder cases. Where an accused unequivocally pleads guilty and admits all essential elements of an offence, including that the conduct amounts to a practice commonly associated with witchcraft, the court may convict without expert evidence as the admission itself constitutes proof of the accused's mental state and commission of the prohibited conduct.

The court observed that the accused's conduct was analogous to setting a time bomb or booby trap in a crowded public place, noting that moral blameworthiness remains high regardless of whether fatal consequences ensue. The court emphasized the wide judicial discretion in sentencing matters, stating that appellate or reviewing courts will not interfere unless the discretion is vitiated by irregularity, incompetence, misdirection, or where the sentence is so severe as to induce a sense of shock (citing S v Nhunwa SC 40/88 and S v Dejager 1965 (2) SA 612). The court commented that the sentence suited both the crime and the offender.

This case clarifies the proper interpretation of section 98(4) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act concerning practices associated with witchcraft. It establishes that the prohibition on judicial notice and requirement for expert evidence applies only to disputed facts, not to facts admitted by an accused person. The judgment reinforces fundamental principles of criminal procedure regarding the effect of admissions and pleas of guilty, confirming that admitted facts constitute sufficient evidence under section 314 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. The case also demonstrates the judiciary's stern approach to conduct intended to undermine the administration of justice through practices associated with witchcraft, particularly when directed at court premises.