The State v Juliet Murega

On 19 December 2015, at her lodgings in Runyararo North West suburb of Masvingo, Zimbabwe, the accused (a 30-year-old woman) was involved in an altercation with her boyfriend (the deceased). The deceased had arrived unannounced and accused her of communicating with other men after she received a text message from her ex-husband. He demanded to see her mobile phone, and when she refused, he assaulted her, hitting her with clenched fists and strangling her. During the struggle inside her room, which was lit by a burning paraffin stove and candle, the deceased caught fire. He sustained 55% third to fourth degree burns consistent with paraffin burns. Despite efforts to douse the flames with water, he was severely burnt and died eleven days later in hospital. Two co-lodgers, Stella Mutakwa and Aletha Manatsa, witnessed parts of the incident but neither saw how exactly the deceased caught fire. The State alleged the accused deliberately drenched the deceased with paraffin from the burning stove and set him ablaze. The accused claimed it was an accident - during the struggle, the deceased slipped, knocked down the lit paraffin stove, spilling the paraffin which ignited his clothes.

• Whether the State proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused deliberately caused the deceased's death by setting him on fire
• Whether the accused's version that the deceased accidentally knocked down the lit paraffin stove during the struggle was reasonably possibly true
• Whether the evidential burden shifted to the accused to explain what happened inside her room
• Whether the inference that the accused deliberately burnt the deceased was the only reasonable inference from the evidence
• The relevance and weight of alleged utterances by the deceased ('Juliet has killed me' and 'These two women have killed me')
• Whether the application for discharge at the close of the State's case should be granted

The accused was found not guilty of murder or any other offence and was discharged.

In a criminal prosecution for murder based on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt must be the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the proven facts. Where an accused provides a version of events that is reasonably possibly true and explains the death as an accident, and where the State's case rests on speculation and suspicion rather than cogent evidence excluding all other reasonable inferences, the accused must be acquitted. While an evidential burden may shift to an accused to explain matters peculiarly within their special knowledge (such as what occurred in a room where only the accused and deceased were present), once the accused provides a plausible explanation consistent with innocence, the State must still prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Suspicion alone, even if it triggers investigation, cannot sustain a conviction without sufficient cogent evidence.

The court made observations about the alleged utterances of the deceased ('Juliet has killed me' and 'These two women have killed me'), noting that even if made, they were contradictory and could be interpreted in various ways, including figuratively rather than as literal accusations of intentional killing. The court noted these statements were only introduced after trial had commenced through amendment of the State's summary of evidence, which diminished their reliability. The court also observed that an 'armchair analysis' in the comfort of the courtroom must take into account the exigencies of the actual situation - in this case, a dark room, an unlawful attack on the accused, and the presence of a lit paraffin stove in the midst of a violent struggle. The court expressed sympathy for the tragic nature of the accident while holding that it was authored by the deceased himself through his unlawful and violent conduct.

This case illustrates important principles in Zimbabwean criminal law (which shares common heritage with South African law) regarding: (1) the burden and standard of proof in murder cases where the State's case relies on circumstantial evidence and inference; (2) the principle that suspicion, speculation and conjecture are insufficient to sustain a criminal conviction; (3) the requirement that where the State relies on inference, it must be the only reasonable inference and all other reasonable inferences must be excluded; (4) the evidential burden that may shift to an accused to explain matters within their special knowledge; (5) the right of self-defense and to resist unlawful assault; and (6) the careful scrutiny courts must apply to evidence introduced or amended after trial has commenced. The case demonstrates judicial restraint in requiring cogent evidence rather than accepting the State's theory based on suspicion.