On 19 December 2015, the deceased Hardlife Ndlovu died from complicated 55%, third to fourth degree burns consistent with paraffin burns. The incident occurred at the accused Juliet Murega's lodgings in Runyararo North West suburb of Masvingo. The deceased and accused were in a relationship. The deceased was assaulting the accused over a telephone call or message he suspected was from another boyfriend. During the scuffle inside the accused's room where a lit paraffin stove provided the only light, the deceased caught fire. No witness saw exactly how the deceased caught fire. Witness Stella Mutakwa heard the deceased screaming "Juliet, you have killed me!" Witness Aletha Manatsa saw the deceased outside with his trousers on fire. The deceased was taken to hospital and died eleven days later. The accused allegedly apologized on the way to the police station.
The application for discharge at the close of the State case was dismissed. The accused was ordered to be placed on her defense.
At the close of the State case, a court shall discharge an accused only where: (a) there is no evidence to prove an essential element of the offence; (b) there is no evidence on which a reasonable court acting carefully might properly convict; or (c) the State evidence is so manifestly unreliable that no reasonable court could safely convict. Statements made by the accused in cross-examination or in defense outlines do not constitute evidence until made under oath. Where the State has led circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable inference of guilt can be drawn, and where the true facts are peculiarly within the special knowledge of the accused, the evidential burden shifts to the accused to provide an explanation, warranting that the accused be placed on her defense.
The court observed that the accused's version that the deceased accidentally slipped and fell onto the lit paraffin stove was "not an unreasonable explanation for the fire" but emphasized this remained merely a preview of potential evidence rather than actual evidence before the court. The court also noted the emotional impact on witness Aletha Manatsa, who wept while testifying due to memories of seeing the deceased dying, suggesting the traumatic nature of the incident, though this observation had no bearing on the legal determination.
This case clarifies the principles governing applications for discharge at the close of the State case in Zimbabwean criminal procedure. It demonstrates that: (1) circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences can be sufficient to establish a prima facie case; (2) courts must not consider the accused's unsworn version in defense outlines or cross-examination as evidence at the discharge stage; (3) where facts are within the special knowledge of the accused, the evidential burden may shift even without direct evidence; and (4) the test is whether a reasonable court acting carefully might convict, not whether guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt at this stage. The case also illustrates proper application of the doctrine of recent possession and res gestae through dying declarations.