The accused appeared before the regional magistrate in Gweru on 25 April 2016 charged with attempted murder in contravention of s47 of the Criminal Law Code. The allegations were that he had beaten his 22-year-old drunken and abusive uncle with a hoe handle on the night of 18 July 2015. The accused pleaded not guilty, giving an unequivocal denial that he never intended to kill the complainant. After the not guilty plea, instead of proceeding with trial, the prosecutor advised the court that he had no evidence to prove intention to kill and suggested the accused was negligent in striking the complainant with a hoe handle, contravening s90 of the Criminal Law Code. The magistrate then questioned the accused person (who was not under oath) leading him to admit negligence. The magistrate convicted the accused of contravening s90 without any evidence being led by the state and without the charge being formally amended. The accused was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment with conditions of suspension.
The conviction was quashed and substituted with a verdict of not guilty and acquittal. Takuva J concurred with the judgment.
Where an accused person pleads not guilty to a criminal charge and the prosecutor thereafter indicates that they have no evidence to prove the charge, the accused is entitled to a verdict of not guilty and acquittal in terms of s9 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. A court cannot convict an accused person of an offence for which they were not charged and to which they did not plead, even if it is suggested as an alternative by the prosecutor. Where the state leads no evidence to prove a charge after a not guilty plea, a conviction based on the magistrate's interrogation of the accused constitutes a substantial miscarriage of justice warranting the quashing of the conviction on review. The presiding judicial officer must not descend into the arena and take over the prosecution's function by interrogating an accused person to elicit admissions that would sustain a conviction.
Mathonsi J made several important observations: (1) The court noted it was remarkable that the trial magistrate sought to direct how the matter should be reviewed, suggesting the reviewing judge apply s29(3) of the High Court Act, when it is the function of the reviewing judge, not the trial court, to determine whether a substantial miscarriage of justice occurred; (2) The court observed that while it could substitute a verdict of guilty to assault as a permissible verdict under s275 read with the 4th Schedule to the Criminal Law Code, this can only be done where evidence led by the state is insufficient to sustain the main charge but proves the lesser charge - not where no evidence is led at all; (3) The court emphasized that absolutely no one, not even a legal representative, can enter a plea on behalf of an accused person - the plea is the accused's own preserve; (4) The judgment criticized the prosecutor for preferring a charge when he had no evidence to sustain it, noting he should have decided on the correct charge that could be sustained by available evidence.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean criminal procedure law as it establishes important safeguards for accused persons and limits on judicial intervention. It reinforces that: (1) An accused person cannot be convicted of an offence to which they did not plead; (2) A magistrate cannot descend into the arena and take over the prosecution's role by interrogating an accused who has pleaded not guilty; (3) The state must prove its case through evidence when a not guilty plea is entered; (4) When a prosecutor indicates no evidence exists to prove a charge after plea, the accused is entitled to acquittal under s9 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act; (5) Courts have a heightened duty to protect the rights of unrepresented accused persons. The case serves as a strong rebuke to procedural irregularities that undermine fair trial rights and the adversarial system of criminal justice.