The State v Edson Jere

On 10 September 2019 at Macheke village, Chief Nhema, Zaka, a one-year-and-two-month-old toddler, Anesu Mudombi, died. The accused, Edson Jere (24 years old), was married to the deceased's mother, Martha Mudombi (also 24 years old). Martha was already 3 months pregnant by another man when she married the accused in 2018, and gave birth to the deceased child shortly after the marriage. The accused allegedly disputed the paternity of the deceased and frequently ill-treated and assaulted the child. On the day in question, Martha left both children in the accused's custody while she went to fetch water from the borehole for about two hours. Upon her return around 11:00hrs, she found the deceased bleeding from the nose and mouth, already dead, with the accused wiping blood from the child. The child's clothes had been changed. The accused told Martha the child had fallen down and warned her not to cry, raise alarm, or inform neighbors. At around 22:00hrs that night, the accused ordered Martha to strap the deceased's body on her back while he carried their younger child, and they traveled to the homestead of Martha's aunt, Shamiso Mudombi. The accused told Shamiso the child had fallen and died, and that he could not bury the child at his parents' home because it was not his child. The accused then fled during the night, claiming to go to the toilet, and was only arrested in January 2020, four months later.

• Whether the accused unlawfully and intentionally caused the death of the deceased child
• Whether circumstantial evidence was sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt
• Whether the accused acted with actual intent to kill
• The competency of a witness suffering from intellectual disability and psychotic features to testify

The accused was found guilty of murder with actual intent in contravention of section 47(1)(a) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23]. He was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment.

Circumstantial evidence may support a conviction for murder with actual intent where the proved facts preclude every reasonable inference of innocence and point exclusively to the guilt of the accused. Medical evidence establishing that death resulted from deliberate violent acts (head injury and strangulation) incompatible with accidental causes, combined with suspicious conduct by the accused (concealing the death, fabricating explanations, fleeing, avoiding police), can constitute sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. A witness suffering from intellectual disability and psychotic features may be competent to testify if a court, assisted by expert psychiatric opinion, determines the witness can give a reasonably coherent account and is not deprived of the proper use of reason as contemplated in section 246 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07].

The court observed that if the accused truly could not accept raising a child not biologically his own, there were alternative remedies available, such as separation from the child's mother or arrangements for the child to be cared for by maternal relatives. The court noted that the accused 'chose to have his cake and eat it' by condoning the alleged infidelity, remaining married, and even having another child with Martha, while simultaneously ill-treating the deceased child. The court remarked that the attendant stigma of having 'the innocent blood of a toddler on his hands would haunt him forever.' The court invoked the adage that 'justice should always be tempered with mercy' in explaining the sentence imposed. Mawadze J expressed the difficulty in understanding why the accused 'found it desirable to take away the life of this child who posed no danger to the accused or had not wronged the accused in any manner,' and noted it was 'improper for the accused to visit the apparent sins of the deceased child's mother on this innocent child.'

This case demonstrates the Zimbabwean courts' approach to cases involving circumstantial evidence in murder prosecutions, particularly where there are no eyewitnesses. It illustrates the application of the R v Blom test requiring that circumstantial evidence must preclude every reasonable inference of innocence. The case also addresses the competency of witnesses with intellectual disabilities to testify, applying sections 245 and 246 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07]. The judgment emphasizes the sanctity of human life and the severity with which courts treat murders of vulnerable victims, particularly young children. It also demonstrates judicial consideration of mitigating factors (youth, first offender status, pre-trial incarceration) even in cases of brutal child murder.