The accused, a 38-year-old single mother of five children, faced two charges. On the first count, she was charged with forgery in contravention of s 137 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act relating to a forged ZETSS application form. On the second count, she was charged with lying under oath in contravention of the Justices of the Peace and Commissioners of Oath Act, arising from a maintenance court application. The accused had filed an application for variation of a maintenance order against Lincoln Tafadzwa Ushamba, the father of one of her daughters (Khloe Lindsay Ushamba), seeking increased maintenance as the child was due to commence primary education at Heritage Primary School. In her answering affidavit, she falsely stated that her two other daughters, Zoe and Cleopatra Damson, were attending Gateway School (comparable to Heritage) when they were actually attending Borrowdale Brooke Academy. Following investigation by Ushamba, this falsehood was discovered. After trial, she was acquitted on the forgery charge but convicted on the second count and sentenced to 15 months imprisonment, with 6 months suspended, leaving an effective term of 9 months.
1. The conviction of the accused person is confirmed. 2. The sentence is set aside and substituted with: 60 days imprisonment of which 45 days imprisonment is suspended for 3 years on condition the accused does not, during that period, commit an offence involving dishonesty for which she is sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a fine. 3. As the accused has served more than the effective 15 days, she is entitled to her immediate release.
Where a statute provides for a penalty of either a fine or imprisonment, it is a misdirection for a sentencing court to impose imprisonment without giving serious consideration to the imposition of a fine, particularly for a first offender. The normal sentence for a first offender in statutory offences permitting a fine is a fine, unless the offence is particularly serious or prevalent, or there would be serious consequences if the deterrent of imprisonment is not used. Sentencing courts must provide adequate reasons when departing from the established policy of keeping first offenders out of prison and must properly weigh mitigating factors against aggravating factors rather than merely paying lip service to them.
Mathonsi J observed that the lie told by the accused was insignificant and trivial, noting "So what? This would not have swayed the maintenance court at all because consideration of an application for variation hinged on the changed circumstances of Khloe and the ability of Khloe's parents to pay. It's such an insignificant lie which may not have affected the outcome." The court also commented that the accused "was lucky not to be charged with contempt of court" in reference to the trial magistrate's reasoning, though this alternative charge was not pursued. The court also noted that imprisonment bears more heavily on female offenders than male counterparts, and that the accused was deprived of caring for her five children as their breadwinner.
This case reinforces the important sentencing principle in Zimbabwean criminal law that first offenders should be kept out of prison wherever possible. It emphasizes that where a statute provides for alternative penalties (fine or imprisonment), sentencing courts must give serious consideration to non-custodial options, particularly for first offenders. The judgment highlights that imprisonment should be reserved for serious cases and that courts must provide adequate reasons when departing from established sentencing policies. It serves as a reminder that sentencing courts must properly balance mitigating and aggravating factors and avoid merely paying lip service to mitigating circumstances.