On 25 February 2015, at plot number 341 Eastdale Ranch, Chatsworth, the accused Christopher Rusike and the deceased Samson Rusike (brothers) were involved in an altercation. The deceased had suspected his wife Stellar Chigora of having an affair with the accused. The deceased had been assaulting his wife and stalking her. During the night, a confrontation occurred at the cattle pen. The deceased attacked his wife with a hoe handle, which was taken away. He then picked up a pestle and attempted to attack the accused. During the struggle, the accused struck the deceased once on the left side of the head with the pestle (or a log). The deceased collapsed, was taken to Gutu Mission Hospital, and was pronounced dead upon arrival on 26 February 2015. The cause of death was severe head injury - laceration and depressed skull fracture. The accused and deceased had previously enjoyed a good relationship.
The application for discharge succeeded. The accused was found not guilty of murder and was acquitted.
An accused must be discharged under section 198(3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act where: (1) there is no evidence to prove an essential element of the offence charged; (2) there is no evidence on which a reasonable court acting carefully might convict; or (3) the evidence led by the State is manifestly unreliable such that no court may rely on it. Where State witnesses are recalcitrant and provide inconsistent testimony that fails to establish the critical elements of the offence, and where witnesses cannot provide direct evidence of the essential facts at the critical moment, discharge must be granted as there is no basis for a safe conviction.
The court provided guidance on the proper procedure for impeaching witnesses under section 316 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, citing S v Mazhambe. Justice Musakwa noted that while the prosecutor's approach was "passable" in indirectly bringing discrepancies to the court's attention, the proper procedure requires the prosecutor to formally inform the court when a witness departs materially from a prior statement. The court observed that prosecutors have a duty to disclose material inconsistencies to the defence (or court where the accused is unrepresented), even when such inconsistencies favour the accused, as they may cast doubt on remaining incriminatory evidence. The court commended the prosecutor for conceding the application rather than "flogging a dead horse" and noted he could have withdrawn the charge after plea. The court also noted it was unnecessary to consider the merits of the private defence claim in detail, save to observe that the defence was put to witnesses who were unable to rebut it.
This case demonstrates the application of section 198(3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act regarding discharge at the close of the State's case. It illustrates the court's willingness to discharge an accused where State witnesses provide manifestly unreliable or inconsistent evidence that cannot sustain a conviction. The case also addresses prosecutorial duties when witnesses depart from prior statements, citing S v Mazhambe regarding disclosure obligations. It reinforces the principle that courts will not convict on unreliable evidence, even in serious cases like murder, and demonstrates proper exercise of judicial discretion in protecting accused persons from unsafe convictions.