On 5 November 2010, the accused was driving a Toyota Hiace minibus (commonly used as a public service vehicle) along the Harare-Bulawayo Road towards Bulawayo. At the 136 kilometer peg, he overtook a haulage truck pulling two trailers in front of oncoming traffic. He abruptly moved back to the left, sideswiping the haulage truck, then swerved right and collided with an oncoming Toyota Canter. As a result of the collision, the Toyota Canter was extensively damaged, two passengers died on the spot, and a third died at hospital. The accused admitted negligence in overtaking across double prohibition lanes, traveling at excessive speed, failing to stop when an accident appeared imminent, and overtaking in front of oncoming traffic.
1. The sentence imposed by the trial magistrate was quashed and set aside. 2. The matter was remitted to the trial court for resentencing in terms of the mandatory statutory provisions.
Where an accused person is convicted of a criminal offence (such as culpable homicide) arising from or in connection with the driving of a motor vehicle, section 64(3) of the Road Traffic Act [Cap 13:11] requires that the accused be sentenced as if convicted under the Road Traffic Act, regardless of whether they were charged under that Act or under common law/the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act. This includes the application of mandatory minimum penalties prescribed under section 53 of the Road Traffic Act for reckless driving. Failure by a trial court to observe and apply mandatory statutory sentencing provisions constitutes a serious misdirection warranting interference on review.
The court made general observations emphasizing the need for magistrates to read and understand the law pertaining to sentence before passing sentence, particularly in serious offences involving the loss of life. BHUNU J noted that vehicles such as Toyota Hiace minibuses (Combis) are "notoriously used as public service motor vehicles for hire or reward," highlighting the particular dangers associated with reckless driving of such vehicles used for public transport. The court also commented that the legislature had foreseen the possibility of accused persons escaping the stiff penalties of the Road Traffic Act through inadvertent charging and had made appropriate safeguards in section 64.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean criminal and road traffic law as it clarifies the application of section 64(3) of the Road Traffic Act, which ensures that accused persons cannot escape the stiff mandatory penalties prescribed under the Road Traffic Act through inadvertent charging under common law or the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act. It emphasizes that when a criminal offence arises from the driving of a motor vehicle, the accused must be sentenced according to the Road Traffic Act regardless of the law under which they were charged. The case also underscores the judiciary's expectation that magistrates conduct proper legal research and apply mandatory sentencing provisions correctly, particularly in serious cases involving loss of life. It serves as a reminder of the importance of adherence to mandatory statutory sentencing requirements and the High Court's supervisory role through criminal review to ensure proper application of the law.