The Daantjie Community and Others v Crocodile Valley Citrus Company (Pty) Ltd and Another

The first to third applicants (the Daantjie Community, Sicelo Audicious Nkosi, and Mpakeni Mlengeni Tribal Authority) applied for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Land Claims Court delivered on 26 February 2015. The February 2015 judgment had dismissed their application for rescission of a default judgment granted against them on 20 November 2008. The applicants sought to claim land under the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994. The evidence, including two expert reports, did not support a clear historic link between the claimant community and the land at the relevant time, nor was there evidence of actual occupation and dispossession. The applicants argued there was no evidence of permanent white settlement in the area claimed prior to 1920, and that the default judgment was an extraordinary and unprecedented exercise of the Court's power.

• Whether leave to appeal should be granted under section 17(1) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
• Whether the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success
• Whether there was a bona fide defence in the rescission application
• Whether the absence of evidence of permanent white settlement prior to 1920 was relevant to the land claim
• Whether the default judgment was an unjustified exercise of the Court's power in the context of community land claims

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed. No order as to costs was made.

The binding legal principle established is that under section 17(1) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, leave to appeal will only be granted where the appeal 'would have a reasonable prospect of success', which requires a measure of certainty that another court will differ from the judgment sought to be appealed against. This represents a higher threshold than the previous test which required merely that another court 'might' come to a different conclusion. In land restitution claims, claimants must establish both occupation of the land and dispossession thereof; the absence of evidence of white settlement prior to a particular date is irrelevant where there is no evidence of the claimant community's occupation and dispossession. The fact that a judgment or order is unprecedented (res nova) is not per se a justification for granting leave to appeal.

The Court observed that the judgment does not deny the claimant community or any part thereof from ever again claiming the land under the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, and that it remains open to them to petition the Supreme Court of Appeal should they wish. The Court also noted that there are no special circumstances in the matter that would warrant deviation from the Land Claims Court's normal principle on costs.

This judgment is significant in South African land reform jurisprudence as it demonstrates the application of the raised threshold for granting leave to appeal under section 17(1) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 in the context of land restitution claims. It confirms that the test requires a measure of certainty (using 'would' rather than 'might') that another court will differ from the decision sought to be appealed. The case also illustrates the evidential burden on claimant communities in land restitution cases to establish historical occupation and dispossession, and that the absence of evidence of white settlement alone is insufficient where there is no evidence of the community's own occupation and dispossession. It also clarifies that dismissal of a rescission application does not necessarily bar future claims under the Restitution of Land Rights Act, as the option of petitioning higher courts remains available.