The applicant, Tetrach Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd, sued out a summons in HC 2978/15 seeking to declare null and void the cession of certain stands (6544, 6533, 6534, 6535 and 6536) in Kwekwe Township to the second respondent, Techmate Engineering (Pvt) Ltd. On 15 February 2011, a resolution purporting to be from "Tetrach Investments (Pvt) Ltd" (a non-existent entity) authorized Irvine Manhire (the first respondent, who was employed by the applicant) to sell the stands to the second respondent for $35,000. The cession was executed and registered with the Municipality of Kwekwe (third respondent). The applicant claimed this cession was unlawful and fraudulent as Irvine Manhire lacked authority and the seller entity did not exist. When the second respondent entered appearance, the applicant brought an application for summary judgment. The deponent of the founding affidavit was Charles Manhire (sharing a surname with Irvine), who was one of the directors of the applicant. The applicant's case relied on an alleged error in the municipal records regarding its name and the lack of authority of its own official who executed the cession.
1. The application for summary judgment is hereby dismissed. 2. The applicant shall bear the second respondent's costs.
To succeed in obtaining summary judgment, an applicant must show that the defendant has no bona fide defence and entered appearance for purposes of delay only. Conversely, to defeat a summary judgment application, the respondent must allege facts which, if established at trial, would entitle him to succeed. Summary judgment is an extraordinary remedy that denies a party the fundamental principle of audi alteram partem and should only be granted when all proposed defences are unarguable both in fact and in law. Where a transaction has been executed by an official of a company and confirmed by the relevant authority, and the company seeks to avoid it based on technical errors in naming and unsubstantiated allegations of lack of authority, without explaining suspicious circumstances or the disposition of consideration received, triable issues exist that preclude summary judgment.
The court made critical observations about the applicant's conduct, describing it as "trifling with the court" when seeking to found a cause of action on vagueness and insignificant errors. The court noted that "life can never be that easy" in reference to the applicant's attempt to reclaim properties without explaining what became of the purchase price. The court also observed that "the applicant seems to be hiding behind a finger, not a very effective instrument for cover" in trying to reverse what appeared to be a genuine sale. The court commented that the aid of a handwriting expert was not required to see that the secretary who signed both resolutions was the same person, suggesting potential complicity within the applicant company in the original transaction.
This case illustrates the high threshold for obtaining summary judgment in Zimbabwe and demonstrates the court's unwillingness to grant this extraordinary remedy where triable issues exist. It emphasizes that courts will scrutinize applications for summary judgment carefully and will not allow parties to deny opponents their right to be heard (audi alteram partem) based on technical irregularities or vague allegations of fraud, particularly where the applicant's own conduct raises questions. The case also highlights the principle that a party cannot benefit from confusion created by its own officials or irregularities in its own records to undo transactions that appear genuine on their face.