Tendai Saimoni and Knowledge Buranda v Zimbabwe Electoral Commission and Minister of Justice N.O. and The Presiding Officer Nomination Court-Chitungwiza-Machona N.O

The first applicant, Tendai Saimoni, a member of the MDC-Alliance, sought to contest as a candidate in local government elections for Ward 3 in St Mary's, Chitungwiza. On 14 June 2018, the nomination day, he prepared his nomination papers and gave them to his chief election agent, Knowledge Buranda (the second applicant), to submit to the Nomination Court at Chitungwiza Municipality Hall. Buranda was attacked by two thugs, Alexio Ngwengwe and Devine Kanyama, who confiscated and tore the nomination papers. A police report was made and the attackers were arrested. The first applicant prepared fresh nomination papers but attempted to file them at 16:30 hours (4:30 PM), after the Nomination Court had closed at 16:00 hours (4:00 PM) as stipulated by law. The third respondent (Presiding Officer) refused to accept the papers as they were submitted after the statutory deadline. Six days later, on 20 June 2018, the applicants filed an urgent chamber application seeking an order compelling the first respondent (Zimbabwe Electoral Commission) to accept the nomination papers, arguing the delay was not their fault and that their constitutional right under s 67 of the Constitution to stand as a candidate would be infringed.

• Whether the High Court has jurisdictional competency to grant an interdict compelling the acceptance of nomination papers outside the statutorily prescribed time limit
• Whether the relief sought contravenes the peremptory provisions of section 46(7) of the Electoral Act
• Whether granting the relief would violate the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution
• Whether an interdict can be granted to compel lawful conduct or alter the lawful refusal by the Nomination Officer
• Whether the applicants had a prima facie right to file nomination papers outside the proclamation period
• Whether the remedies under section 133B of the Electoral Act are the exclusive remedies available for persons prevented from submitting papers due to violence or intimidation

The application was dismissed. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs.

The High Court lacks jurisdictional competency to grant an interdict compelling the acceptance of nomination papers outside the time limit peremptorily prescribed by section 46(7) of the Electoral Act, as this would effectively set an additional sitting of the Nomination Court outside what is provided in section 144 of the Constitution, thereby contravening the principle of separation of powers. An interdict cannot be granted against lawful conduct or to alter a lawful administrative decision made in compliance with statute. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under section 165(1)(c) of the Constitution is exercised in furtherance of the rule of law and does not extend to making orders that subvert statutory provisions. Where the legislature has enacted specific remedies for particular circumstances (such as section 133B for violence or intimidation preventing submission of nomination papers), the expression of one thing means the exclusion of another, and courts cannot create additional remedies beyond those provided by statute.

The court observed that the letter from the first respondent advising the applicant to approach the court was not inconsistent with the Electoral Act's position and did not endow the court with jurisdiction—it simply indicated that if the applicant was not satisfied with the Commission's answer, they could hear it from the court. The court also noted that while the circumstances faced by the applicant (having his papers stolen by thugs) may invoke sympathy, the existence of civil and criminal allegations arising from such circumstances cannot be the basis for finding that the court has jurisdiction to grant relief outside the statutory framework. The court remarked that there is no prejudice to speak of when one asks for unlawful relief, and urgency cannot attach to such relief.

This case is significant in Zimbabwean electoral law and constitutional jurisprudence as it clarifies the limits of judicial intervention in electoral processes governed by statute and presidential proclamation. It reinforces the principle of separation of powers, establishing that courts cannot use their inherent jurisdiction to effectively amend or override peremptory statutory provisions, even in circumstances where an applicant may have been prevented from complying with those provisions through no fault of their own. The case affirms that interdicts cannot be granted to compel alteration of lawful administrative decisions made in compliance with statute, and that where the legislature has provided specific remedies (such as section 133B of the Electoral Act), these constitute the exclusive remedies available. The judgment emphasizes that inherent jurisdiction is exercised in furtherance of the rule of law, not to subvert statutory provisions. It also clarifies that the right to stand for election under section 67 of the Constitution must be exercised within the procedural framework established by electoral legislation.