The first applicant, Tendai Biti, was a Member of Parliament for Harare East and a member of the National Executive of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), the main opposition party. On 28 January 2002, Biti wrote to the Officer Commanding the Police, Harare Suburban District, notifying her that the MDC would be holding twelve public meetings in the Harare East constituency from 2 to 23 February 2002, as required by section 24(1) of the Public Order and Security Act. In reply, the police informed Biti that only four of the twelve meetings could be held and the rest were prohibited for various reasons. Aggrieved by this decision, the applicants approached the Supreme Court directly under section 24(1) of the Constitution, alleging that section 24 of the Public Order and Security Act infringed their rights of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly.
The application was dismissed with no order as to costs.
A statutory requirement to give advance written notice of a public gathering infringes the constitutional rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. However, such infringement is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society under sections 20(2)(a) and 21(3)(a) of the Constitution where: (1) the purpose is to afford authorities a reasonable opportunity to anticipate or prevent public disorder or breach of the peace, and to ensure gatherings do not unduly interfere with the rights of others or lead to traffic obstruction or public disorder; (2) the provision does not arbitrarily or excessively invade the protected rights; and (3) the provision merely requires notice and does not grant power to prohibit gatherings. The test for what is 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society' is whether the provision arbitrarily invades the enjoyment of a constitutionally guaranteed right.
The Court made important general observations about the importance of freedom of expression and assembly in a democratic society, citing In re Munhumeso & Ors 1994 (1) ZLR 49(S), stating that these freedoms 'lie at the foundation of a democratic society' and are 'one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man.' The Court enumerated four special purposes served by freedom of expression: (i) helping individuals obtain self-fulfillment; (ii) assisting in the discovery of truth; (iii) strengthening the capacity of individuals to participate in decision-making; and (iv) providing a mechanism to establish a reasonable balance between stability and social change. The Court also recognized the need to reconcile protected rights with governmental responsibility to ensure maintenance of public order, requiring a compromise that accommodates the exercise of protected rights within a framework of public order. The Court's reference to United Kingdom legislation (Public Order Act 1986) was obiter, used as comparative illustration rather than binding authority.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean constitutional law as it established the approach to balancing fundamental rights of freedom of expression and assembly against public order and safety concerns. The judgment clarified that while notice requirements for public gatherings do constitute an infringement of constitutional rights, such infringement may be justified in a democratic society where it serves legitimate public safety and public order purposes and does not arbitrarily or excessively restrict the protected rights. The case demonstrates the court's application of the limitation clauses in the Constitution and the test for determining what is 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.' It also illustrates the court's willingness to consider comparative jurisprudence from other jurisdictions.