The applicant was a former employee of the first respondent. Following his dismissal, the parties engaged in protracted litigation. The first respondent obtained a court order against the applicant for payment of US$638.00 in execution costs. When the applicant failed to repay, the second respondent placed the applicant's immovable property under judicial attachment. The applicant unsuccessfully applied to stay execution under HC 1284/23, claiming he had settled the debt and that the property was jointly owned with his wife. The High Court dismissed the application. The applicant then appealed (SCB 81/25, pending) and filed a chamber application for correction of the judgment (HCBC 413/25, pending). Despite the suspension of execution, the applicant filed an urgent chamber application before the Supreme Court (SCB 88/25) seeking a stay of execution. That application was struck off the roll for want of proof of proper service on the first respondent. The applicant then brought the present application under rule 29(1)(b) seeking correction of the Supreme Court's order in SCB 88/25, alleging patent errors in the interpretation of service rules and in accepting the first respondent's heads of argument without proper opposing papers.
The application was dismissed. The applicant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs on the legal practitioner and client scale.
A patent error for purposes of rule 29(1)(b) is a mistake by the court in pronouncing its intended judgment or order—an inconsistency between what the court intended and what was actually pronounced. The rule does not permit a court to revisit the merits of its decision, substitute its judgment with a completely different outcome, or entertain substantive challenges disguised as requests for correction. Relief under rule 29(1)(b) is limited to correction of the ambiguity, error or omission itself, and must not alter the sense and substance of the judgment or order. The Supreme Court has no power under section 25 of the Supreme Court Act to review its own decisions; that provision applies only to inferior courts, tribunals and administrative authorities.
The Court observed that the applicant had developed a pattern of instituting multiple applications simultaneously, some of which could have been avoided by accepting procedural inadequacies and correcting them. The Court noted that while self-represented litigants are generally entitled to a degree of latitude, such indulgence is not unbounded, particularly where the litigant is experienced and the conduct unnecessarily burdens the judicial process. The Court invoked the lament in Ndebele v Ncube 1992 (1) ZLR 288 (S) that there ought to be finality in litigation, lest the costs of pursuing it ultimately exceed the capital sum in dispute. The Court also noted that the applicant could have rectified the procedural defect found by the court and prosecuted his claim with expedition as provided for by Practice Direction 3 of 2013, rather than instituting a fresh application for correction.
This judgment clarifies the narrow and confined scope of rule 29(1)(b) of the High Court Rules 2021 (as read with rule 81 of the Supreme Court Rules 2025) governing correction of judgments. It confirms that the rule exists solely to allow a court to reconcile ambiguities or correct errors apparent on the face of the order that do not require revisiting evidence, arguments, or substantive findings. The judgment reinforces the principle of finality in litigation and emphasizes that correction applications cannot be used as a backdoor mechanism to reopen or appeal a court's substantive decision. The case also confirms that section 25 of the Supreme Court Act does not empower the Supreme Court to review its own decisions, and that frivolous applications that abuse court process may attract punitive costs even when brought by self-represented litigants who are experienced in litigation.