Telone (Private) Limited v Edwin Matinyarare

The respondent was employed by the applicant (Telone) as Head Administration and was allocated a Toyota Hilux registration number ABD 8617 as part of his employment benefits. On 3 June 2011, the applicant terminated the respondent's employment following disciplinary proceedings under the National Code of Conduct. The respondent was allowed to use the vehicle while on suspension. The respondent noted an appeal to the Labour Relations Office challenging his dismissal, which was still pending. The applicant then approached the High Court seeking to recover the vehicle from the respondent, arguing that the respondent had no lawful basis to retain the vehicle after termination of employment and was contravening section 57 of the Road Traffic Act.

• Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain an application for recovery of company property (rei vindicatio) when the underlying employment termination is under appeal to the Labour Court
• Whether the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes relating to property possessed by an employee in terms of an employment contract
• Whether the noting of an appeal in terms of section 92E of the Labour Act suspends the decision appealed against
• Whether the respondent had established a defence of claim of right to continue possessing the vehicle pending determination of the labour appeal

The application was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

Where an employee possesses employer property by virtue of an employment contract, and the termination of that contract is under challenge before the Labour Court, the possession of that property is so interdependently linked to the contract that the dispute over possession falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court, not the High Court. The Labour Court's special jurisdiction prevails even where a dispute could also be framed as a common law cause of action. An employee's common law claim of right to possess employer property remains valid for as long as the challenge to dismissal is alive and not fully determined, notwithstanding that section 92E of the Labour Act provides that an appeal does not suspend the dismissal decision.

The court observed that if it had erred on jurisdiction and did have jurisdiction to hear the matter, it would have found for the respondent on the merits and dismissed the application as premature. The court noted that the unintended consequence of allowing the High Court to exercise jurisdiction in such matters would be to make a mockery of the legislature's clear intention in creating a special Labour Court. The court also commented that the applicant's position would leave disputes without an adjudicating authority in certain circumstances, but this concern was not sufficient to override the Labour Court's exclusive jurisdiction.

This case reinforces the principle that the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction over employment-related disputes in Zimbabwe, including disputes over property possessed by employees pursuant to employment contracts. It clarifies that employers cannot circumvent the Labour Court's jurisdiction by framing employment-related property disputes as common law rei vindicatio claims. The judgment is significant for establishing that where possession of property is interdependently linked to an employment contract under dispute, the matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court, not the High Court. It also clarifies that while section 92E of the Labour Act provides that an appeal does not suspend a dismissal decision, an employee's common law claim of right to property remains valid until the underlying labour dispute is definitively resolved.