The respondent was employed by the applicant as a salesman/driver until October 2013 when he was dismissed following disciplinary proceedings for misconduct. The respondent challenged the dismissal through multiple proceedings: an internal appeal (dismissed); arbitration proceedings (unfair dismissal claim dismissed, overtime claim upheld on 30 June 2014); the applicant appealed the overtime award to the Labour Court and it was set aside; the respondent appealed to the Labour Court on 29 July 2014 which was dismissed on 19 December 2014 (LC/H/824/2014). Subsequently, the respondent filed: an application for condonation for late filing of leave to appeal (dismissed 2 November 2018, LC/H/483/2018); a chamber application to the Supreme Court for condonation (withdrawn after being found fatally defective on 7 October 2019); another application for condonation to the Labour Court on 28 November 2019 (dismissed 3 July 2020, LC/H/148/2020); and an application for leave to appeal against LC/H/148/2020 filed on 13 August 2020 (still pending at time of hearing). The applicant, claiming harassment through incessant litigation and incurring substantial unrecoverable legal costs, sought a decree of perpetual silence against the respondent.
1. The respondent is barred in perpetuity from instituting any proceedings whatsoever and in whatever form or forum against the applicant in respect of the terminated employment relationship between the applicant and the respondent; and any judgments issued by the Labour Court or the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe in respect thereof without leave of the Court. 2. The respondent shall pay the costs of suit.
The binding principle established is that courts have inherent jurisdiction to grant a decree of perpetual silence against a litigant where: (1) there is a proven pattern of vexatious, serial and abusive litigation; (2) the litigant has repeatedly instituted proceedings over the same subject matter that has already been finally determined; (3) the conduct amounts to harassment of the other party and abuse of court processes; and (4) less drastic measures (such as adverse costs orders) have failed to deter the litigant. While the constitutional right of access to courts under section 69(3) is fundamental, it is not absolute and may be limited under section 86 of the Constitution in exceptional circumstances where a litigant refuses to accept judicial determinations and persistently files meritless proceedings. The court must balance the constitutional right to be heard against its duty to regulate its processes and protect parties from abusive litigation.
The court observed that the respondent genuinely believed in the strength of his case and was not acting in bad faith, but was rather a bitter litigant desperately seeking recourse. However, the court noted that genuine belief in one's case, when pursued through endless litigation after final determinations have been made, can still constitute an abuse of process. The court commented that litigation has to come to an end at some point and that using litigation as a weapon to harass another party is conduct that courts will not countenance. The court noted with approval the dictum from City of Harare v Tendai Susan Masamba that courts may shut their doors temporarily or perpetually depending on circumstances, and that frivolous, vexatious or burdensome litigation, incessant lawsuits producing unpaid costs, and other infractions are intolerable and may lead to closure of court doors. The court also observed that even the Labour Court had expressed frustration over the respondent's conduct in its previous judgments.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean jurisprudence as it demonstrates the court's willingness to use its inherent jurisdiction to grant drastic remedies such as decrees of perpetual silence to prevent abuse of court processes by serial and vexatious litigators. It illustrates the balance between protecting the fundamental constitutional right of access to courts under section 69(3) of the Constitution and preventing abuse of judicial processes. The case establishes that while the right to be heard is sacrosanct, it is not absolute and can be legitimately limited under section 86 of the Constitution in exceptional circumstances. It provides guidance on when courts will intervene to protect both their own processes and parties being harassed by relentless, meritless litigation. The judgment reinforces that litigation must come to an end at some point and that courts will not allow their systems to be clogged with hopeless litigation by parties who refuse to accept defeat.