Techmate Engineering (Pvt) Ltd v Provincial Mining Director, Gwanda N.O. and White Nile

Techmate Engineering (applicant) held title to mining claims Goodenough 7-8, Reg. No. 34308-9, registered on 5 May 1988. White Nile (2nd respondent) held Special Grant SG 8565, granted on 19 May 2021. A dispute arose when applicant complained that 2nd respondent (Brian Samuriwo) was encroaching on its mining claims. The Provincial Mining Director (1st respondent) conducted a hearing after surveyors visited the disputed claims. The surveyors' report indicated that Goodenough 7-8 were pegged earlier than SG 8565, but the boundaries overlapped, with deviations from ground-indicated positions versus registration positions. Crucially, the shafts under contest were found to fall within SG 8565 boundary and outside Goodenough boundaries. On 19 October 2021, the 1st respondent ruled that the shafts fell within SG 8565, ordered 2nd respondent to adjust SG 8565 boundaries outside Goodenough 7-8, and ordered applicant to revert to its boundary position as at registration. Applicant sought review of this decision on grounds of bias, gross irregularity, and irrationality.

• Whether the 1st respondent was biased in conducting the hearing and making his determination
• Whether the decision of the 1st respondent was so irrational as to be reviewable
• Whether the 1st respondent erred in using GPS system to determine boundaries when the claims were originally pegged in 1988 without GPS
• Whether consequential relief can be granted in a review application
• The distinction between appeal and review proceedings

The application was dismissed with costs on a party-and-party scale in favor of the 2nd respondent.

The binding legal principles established are: (1) In review proceedings, courts are concerned with the decision-making process, not whether the decision was right or wrong on the merits. (2) Bias must be established by showing that a reasonable person in the position of the litigant would have a reasonable suspicion, based on reasonable grounds, that the decision-maker might be biased. Giving both parties the right of audience does not constitute bias. (3) A decision is irrational and reviewable only if it is unsupported by evidence, has no connection between evidence and reasons, or the reasons are unintelligible - it is not sufficient that the court would have reached a different conclusion. (4) Courts must examine whether the means selected by the decision-maker are rationally related to the objective sought, not whether other means could have been used. (5) Under section 28 of the High Court Act [Chapter 7:06], a court on review can only set aside or correct the proceedings or decision complained of - it cannot grant consequential relief such as declaring rights or setting aside third party decisions. Such relief must be sought through other proceedings.

The court observed that the 1st respondent, being cited in his official capacity and not participating in the hearing, was taken to have adopted the position that he would abide by the court's decision. The court also noted that applicant's real grievance was dissatisfaction with what it considered a wrong decision on facts and law - an appeal matter rather than review. The court remarked that the choice of methodology (GPS system versus other methods) for determining boundaries is within the discretion of the administrative decision-maker, and courts should not dictate such choices. The judgment emphasized that even where a decision may appear wrong to a party, this does not render it irrational or reviewable - the question is whether there is a rational basis between the outcome and the material available justifying the decision.

This case is significant in Zimbabwean administrative law for clarifying the fundamental distinction between review and appeal proceedings. It reaffirms that judicial review is concerned with the decision-making process, not the correctness of the decision on its merits. The judgment provides important guidance on: (1) the test for bias in administrative proceedings; (2) the standard for irrationality in reviewing administrative decisions - that courts examine whether means selected are rationally related to the objective, not whether other means could have been used; and (3) the important principle that consequential relief cannot be granted in review applications under section 28 of the High Court Act - the court can only set aside or correct the impugned decision and must remit the matter for proper determination. The case reinforces Lord Brightman's warning in Chief Constable of North Wales Police v Evans that courts must not, under the guise of preventing abuse of power, usurp power by reviewing the merits rather than the process.