The applicant sought an interdict to prevent the execution of a default judgment granted under HC 1210/10. The applicant challenged the default judgment on the basis that it was not properly obtained. However, by the time of the hearing, the applicant had already been evicted from the premises pursuant to the judgment. The applicant sought interim relief including, if eviction had already taken place, that the respondents be directed to give the applicant vacant possession of the premises. The first respondent had proceeded with the eviction before the application was heard.
The application for an interdict was dismissed with costs.
An interim interdict is not a remedy for past invasions of rights and will not be granted to a person whose rights in a thing have already been taken from them by operation of law at the time the application for interim relief is made. An interdict is a prospective remedy that operates to prevent future harm, not a retrospective remedy to restore rights already lost.
The court observed that the applicant was seeking restoration of possession after eviction, which evidenced that the applicant was attempting to use an interdict to remedy a past invasion of rights rather than prevent a future one. The court noted that it was the first respondent who had proceeded with the eviction and that the applicant characterized this as the respondent "clinging on an unlawful order" and "trying to delay the inevitable."
This case reinforces the established principle in Zimbabwean law (applicable to South African jurisprudence given the shared legal heritage and reliance on South African authorities) that interim interdicts are prospective remedies designed to prevent future harm or ongoing invasions of rights, not retrospective remedies to redress past violations. The case demonstrates that once rights have been extinguished by operation of law (such as through execution of a judgment), an interdict is not the appropriate remedy and other legal avenues must be pursued.