Tanya Robyn Haden Tebb v Denton Leslie Boshi and Magistrate Nyasha Marufu N.O

On 31 March 2020, the applicant applied for a protection order in terms of the Domestic Violence Act [Chapter 5:16] against the first respondent. An interim order was issued by the second respondent (Magistrate). On 11 June 2020, after hearing submissions from the parties, the second respondent granted a reciprocal protection order which protected both parties against each other. The reciprocal order arose after the first respondent's legal practitioner suggested that the court make an order protecting both parties, and the applicant's legal practitioner consented to this proposal. The Magistrate then issued a ruling granting the reciprocal order, reasoning that the applicant had not presented sufficient evidence to support her claims of threats, and that both parties needed protection. The applicant was aggrieved by this decision and sought to have it reviewed.

• Whether a reciprocal protection order granted in domestic violence proceedings is reviewable when it resulted partly from a concession by the parties
• Whether the Magistrate's decision to grant a reciprocal protection order was grossly irregular, unreasonable, irrational, and tainted with bias and malice
• Whether a protection order can be granted in favour of a party who did not apply for one in terms of the Domestic Violence Act
• Whether the procedure for setting aside consent orders applies to a review of a reciprocal protection order

The review application was dismissed with costs.

A reciprocal protection order granted under the Domestic Violence Act is reviewable when it results not only from the parties' consent but also from the Magistrate's consideration and analysis of evidence. Where parties agree to a reciprocal protection order during proceedings, and the order protects both parties from each other as a single unified order (rather than separate orders), it does not constitute a gross irregularity merely because one party did not initiate an application for protection as required by the Act. The critical distinction is between a single reciprocal order protecting mutual interests and separate orders where one party receives relief without having applied for it.

The court observed that it would have been grossly irregular if the Magistrate had dismissed the applicant's application and granted the first respondent a separate protection order in circumstances where the first respondent had not made an application in terms of the Act. This suggests that the form of the order matters - a unified reciprocal order is treated differently from separate orders in favour of parties who did not apply. The court also implicitly recognized that while strict procedural compliance with the Domestic Violence Act is important, consensual resolution of disputes is permissible where it does not undermine the statutory scheme or prejudice the parties.

This case clarifies the reviewability of reciprocal protection orders granted under the Domestic Violence Act [Chapter 5:16] in Zimbabwe. It establishes that such orders are reviewable when they result not merely from consent but also from judicial evaluation of evidence. The case also demonstrates that while the Act prescribes specific procedures for obtaining protection orders, a reciprocal order protecting both parties may be granted where both parties consent and the order serves both parties' interests, without constituting a gross irregularity. This provides guidance on the interplay between statutory procedural requirements and consensual dispute resolution in domestic violence proceedings.