Takanayi Mureyi v Fortune Charumbira

The applicant was a candidate for the MDC-T party who contested and lost the Masvingo West National Assembly seat in the harmonized elections of 31 July 2013. He subsequently filed an electoral petition (EC 35/13) challenging the election results. The respondent was a Traditional Chief in the Masvingo West Constituency and President of the Traditional Chiefs' Council in Zimbabwe. The applicant alleged that after the elections, the respondent continued to conduct meetings and rallies in the constituency, denouncing him and his party MDC-T, and that these meetings were addressed by the winning ZANU PF candidate, Mr Ezra Chadzamura. The applicant alleged the respondent was coercing villagers to attend partisan political meetings, threatening them with death or evictions for supporting the applicant and MDC-T, and uttering hate language such as "Down with Takanayi Mureyi." The applicant produced supporting affidavits from villagers recounting their experiences, though some related to events before the election. The applicant sought an urgent interdict to stop the respondent from engaging in political activities and uttering hate language.

• Whether the applicant had established the requirements for an interdict: a clear right, injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended, and absence of similar protection by any other ordinary remedy
• Whether the respondent, as a Traditional Chief, was prohibited from engaging in partisan political activities under section 281(2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act 2013
• Whether the applicant had exhausted other available remedies before approaching the court for an interdict
• Whether granting the interdict would improperly interfere with the respondent's constitutional duties as a Traditional Chief under section 282 of the Constitution

The urgent application was dismissed with costs.

An applicant seeking an interdict must establish: (1) a clear right, (2) injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended, and (3) the absence of similar protection by any other ordinary remedy. Even where constitutional violations by traditional leaders are alleged, an interdict will not be granted if the applicant has not first exhausted other available remedies, including reporting to police and invoking administrative mechanisms under the Traditional Leaders Act (section 7). The court will not grant an interdict that would interfere with a traditional leader's legitimate constitutional functions under section 282 of the Constitution unless it is demonstrated that alternative remedies are unavailable or have been denied.

The court observed that section 281(2) of the Constitution clearly prohibits traditional leaders from engaging in partisan politics, and if the allegations against the respondent were true, such conduct would be illegal. The court noted that the applicant appeared to be seeking support for his electoral petition through this application, as suggested by paragraphs 12-15 of the founding affidavit. The court commented that the applicant's evidence was largely hearsay-based, as he did not personally witness or hear the alleged threats and denunciations but relied on what he had been told. The court acknowledged that citizens have every right to approach the court on an urgent basis where threats against their lives are made by any person regardless of status, but emphasized that proper procedures and alternative remedies must first be pursued.

This case is significant in Zimbabwean jurisprudence as it clarifies the constitutional prohibition on traditional leaders engaging in partisan politics under the new Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act 2013, particularly sections 281(2) and 282. It demonstrates the court's approach to balancing constitutional rights and duties of traditional leaders with electoral integrity concerns. The judgment establishes that despite clear constitutional prohibitions on political activity by traditional leaders, applicants seeking interdicts must first exhaust other available remedies, including criminal complaints to police and administrative remedies under the Traditional Leaders Act. The case also illustrates the principle that courts will not grant interdicts that would interfere with the legitimate constitutional functions of traditional leaders unless alternative remedies have been properly pursued and exhausted.