Suscaden Investments (Private) Limited v Parks and Wildlife Management Authority and The Minister of Environment, Water and Natural Resources

The applicant and the first respondent (Parks and Wildlife Management Authority) entered into a deed of settlement and a 25-year lease agreement on 8 September 2017. In terms of the lease, the applicant leased approximately 3 square kilometres in the Chewore Safari Area near the confluence of the Zambezi and Chewore Rivers, with an additional 40 square kilometres from 1 January 2022. On 16 March 2022, the respondent gave the applicant six months' notice to vacate the leased area. The applicant objected, asserting its rights under the lease. The respondent then barred the applicant's clients from entering the leased area, leading to an urgent application (HC 6592/22) before Mangota J, who on 5 October 2022 granted a consent order allowing access subject to Parks and Wildlife Act provisions. On 6 October 2022, the respondent wrote to the applicant requiring written applications for all permits prior to accessing the lodge. The respondent also deployed two armed officers to the lodge preventing guests from undertaking activities under clause 6.1 of the lease. The applicant was forced to cancel bookings and refund guests, prompting this urgent application for an interdict.

• Whether the certificate of urgency was defective
• Whether the relief sought was competent
• The proper interpretation of paragraph 1 of the consent order granted by Mangota J
• The proper interpretation of clause 6.1 of the lease agreement
• Whether the respondent was entitled to interfere with the applicant's business operations under the lease agreement
• The proper procedure for obtaining permits for activities within the leased area

Interim relief granted interdicting the 1st and 2nd respondents from interfering with the applicant's occupation, business operations and rights under the Deed of Settlement and Lease Agreement dated 8 September 2017. The applicant's employees, agents and clients were permitted to conduct activities at the Chewore lodge and campsite in terms of paragraph 6.1 of the Lease Agreement and in terms of the usual permits granted and issued by the 1st respondent's functionaries at the various entry points to the park. The applicant's legal practitioners were given leave to serve the provisional order on the respondents. The matter was to return to court for confirmation of the final order.

The binding legal principles established are: (1) The certificate of urgency is not the sole determinant of urgency - the court must consider the entirety of the circumstances including the founding affidavit when assessing urgency under Rule 60(6). (2) Where parties to a lease agreement have established a settled practice for compliance with statutory permit requirements (obtaining permits at entry points), the lessor cannot unilaterally impose new onerous procedures that effectively frustrate the lessee's contractual rights. (3) Statutory permit requirements under environmental and wildlife legislation must be applied in a manner consistent with valid contractual rights and cannot be used as a pretext to undermine those rights. (4) Where parties agree on the essential terms of an interdict during proceedings, including agreed amendments addressing legitimate concerns, the court should grant the relief as amended.

The court observed that the respondent's counsel should have taken full instructions earlier in the proceedings given that the court had identified the core issue at the first hearing, rather than requesting postponements. The court expressed some frustration with the respondent's approach to the matter, noting that the parties had been directed to discuss the interpretation of the consent order and clause 6.1 of the lease but came to the second hearing "braced for arguments" rather than having engaged in meaningful discussion. The court also noted that from the correspondence between the parties, there appeared to have been "some fall out which may have led to interference with the applicant's business operations," suggesting underlying relationship difficulties beyond the immediate legal dispute.

This case is significant in Zimbabwean administrative and contract law as it clarifies the interaction between statutory permit requirements under environmental and wildlife legislation and contractual rights under lease agreements. It establishes that administrative authorities cannot use permit requirements as a pretext to frustrate valid contractual rights, and that established practices for obtaining permits (at points of entry) cannot unilaterally be altered to impose onerous new procedures. The judgment also reinforces principles regarding the assessment of urgency in urgent chamber applications, confirming that courts must look beyond the certificate of urgency to the substantive facts in the founding affidavit. The case demonstrates the court's willingness to protect business operations from arbitrary administrative interference where there are valid subsisting contractual rights.