Steven Arthur Dare v Arthur Dare and Others

The applicant (Steven Arthur Dare) and the 1st respondent (Arthur Dare, his father) were in dispute over an immovable property known as 45 Southway Road, Burnside, Bulawayo. The 2nd respondent was the applicant's stepmother, and the 3rd respondent was Bookset (Pvt) Ltd, a company in which the applicant and 1st and 2nd respondents were shareholders. The applicant claimed he purchased the property with his own funds but registered it in the name of the 3rd respondent. On 4 January 2022, the 1st respondent emailed the applicant advising that the 3rd respondent would sell the property for USD 180,000 and offered him a right of first refusal. On 5 January 2022, the 1st respondent stated he would sign an Agreement of Sale by the end of the week if the applicant did not accept. The applicant responded on 5 January 2022 stating he had instructed a solicitor to object to the sale and apply for a court order. The applicant issued summons on 10 February 2022 (HC 235/22) and filed this urgent application on 9 March 2022 seeking an interdict to prevent the sale and transfer of the property pending finalization of the main action.

• Whether the matter qualified as urgent under the rules of court
• Whether the applicant had acted with the requisite urgency when the need to act arose
• Whether the delay between January 2022 (when the threat was communicated) and March 2022 (when the urgent application was filed) was justified

The urgent application was struck off the roll with costs awarded against the applicant.

An urgent application will be struck off the roll where the applicant fails to act promptly when the need to do so arises. The test for urgency requires the applicant to demonstrate that they acted with dispatch once the threat or harm became known. A delay of approximately two months between when the applicant recognized the need for urgent relief (as evidenced by their own correspondence) and the filing of the urgent application is fatal to establishing urgency. An applicant cannot justify delay on the basis of family discussions or negotiations when there is no undertaking from the respondent to refrain from the threatened action. The commencement of ordinary litigation (issuing summons) provides a further opportunity to file urgent interdictory relief, and failure to do so within a reasonable time (the court suggested within a week) negates urgency.

The court observed that had the applicant acted when he issued summons on 10 February 2022, he would have been expected to file an urgent chamber application within a week thereafter. This suggests the court's view on what would constitute reasonable timeframes in similar circumstances. The court also noted that urgent matters "cannot wait" - emphasizing the fundamental nature of urgency as requiring immediate action without delay for discussions unless there are guarantees that the threatened action will not proceed.

This case reinforces the strict approach Zimbabwean courts take toward urgency requirements in urgent applications. It establishes that applicants must act promptly when the need arises and cannot justify delays based on informal family discussions or negotiations when there is no undertaking to preserve the status quo. The case demonstrates that even when litigation has commenced (such as the main action HC 235/22), applicants seeking urgent interdictory relief must act immediately and cannot delay for additional periods. The judgment emphasizes that urgency is determined by when the applicant knew or ought to have known that action was necessary, not when the applicant eventually decided to approach the court.