State v Vennah Taguta and Raster Last Taguta

On 20 December 2019, at Nyamadzawo Village, Chief Marange, Mutare, two accused persons attacked and killed Vennah Matara (aged 67). The first accused (Vennah Taguta, aged 18) was the deceased's granddaughter, and the second accused (Raster Last Taguta) was the deceased's stepson. Both accused believed the deceased was a witch who had initiated the first accused into witchcraft when she was young and caused the second accused's child to become ill. A day before the killing, on 19 December 2019, the second accused had threatened the deceased with an axe but was disarmed. At around 2100 hours on 20 December 2019, both accused went to the deceased's kitchen hut. They entered while the deceased was sleeping with her grandson Oncemore Mangena. The first accused sat on the deceased's abdomen while the second accused assaulted her with fists, booted feet, a burning wooden log, a plough shear, and a pot lid, striking her on the head and body. The deceased died from severe head injuries. The first accused initially pleaded guilty to culpable homicide and implicated her mother-in-law Chipiwa Mutsambiwa, but under cross-examination admitted planning with the second accused. The second accused claimed he was asleep at home with his wife.

• Whether both accused were guilty of murder under section 47(1)(a) or (b) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23]
• Whether the doctrine of common purpose applied to impute liability to both accused
• Whether the evidence of the first accused as an accomplice could be relied upon without corroboration
• Whether belief in witchcraft could serve as a mitigatory factor under section 101 of the Criminal Code
• Whether the requirements of section 196A of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act were satisfied
• Whether the first accused had a defence of compulsion

First accused (Vennah Taguta): Found guilty of murder with actual intent and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. Second accused (Raster Last Taguta): Found guilty of murder with actual intent and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.

Where two or more persons act in common purpose to kill another person, the act of one participant in causing death is imputed as a matter of law to all participants, and a causal link between each individual's acts and the death need not be separately proved to sustain a murder conviction for each participant. Evidence from an accomplice must be approached with caution due to the danger of false incrimination, but may be relied upon where corroborated by other evidence (direct or circumstantial) that eliminates the risk of false incrimination. The requirements of section 196A of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act are satisfied where an accused was present at the scene, participated in assaulting the victim while alive, and delivered or participated in delivering mortal wounds. A genuine belief in witchcraft under section 101 of the Criminal Code is a mitigatory factor in sentencing, not a defence to murder.

The court observed that it is not necessary for accomplice evidence to be entirely unblemished to be credible - there are degrees of credibility, and the court may accept trustworthy portions of evidence while rejecting unsatisfactory features. The court noted that the cautionary approach to single witness testimony should not displace the exercise of common sense. The court commented that the second accused, being older than the first accused, should have shown exemplary behavior and sought help from traditional leaders and healers rather than taking the deceased's life. The court emphasized that neither accused offered assistance to the deceased as she groaned in pain and died. The court noted that although the deceased may have initiated the first accused into witchcraft, this did not justify terminating her God-given life. The accomplice whose evidence is most dangerous to rely upon is one who committed the crime jointly with the accused, as such a person can most easily shift blame.

This case illustrates the application of the common purpose doctrine in Zimbabwean criminal law, where the acts of one participant in a jointly planned killing are imputed to all participants. It demonstrates the court's approach to accomplice evidence, showing that while caution is required, such evidence can be accepted if corroborated by circumstantial evidence and surrounding facts. The case also addresses the role of witchcraft beliefs under section 101 of the Criminal Code as a mitigatory (not exculpatory) factor in sentencing. The judgment affirms that genuine belief in witchcraft cannot justify taking the law into one's own hands. The case further demonstrates the application of section 196A of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act in establishing murder liability where multiple assailants participate in a fatal attack.