The accused lived with his uncle, the complainant Stanley Madyambudzi, aged 56. A misunderstanding arose over food. The accused assaulted the complainant using clenched fists and booted feet all over his body. He also head-butted the complainant, who sustained a bleeding eye. The complainant reported the assault to police. There was no indication that the complainant needed medical attention or that police requested a medical examination to assess the degree of injury. The accused was initially convicted on his own plea of guilty to physical abuse under the Domestic Violence Act and sentenced to 14 months imprisonment, of which 7 months were suspended on condition he performed community service. The matter came before the High Court on criminal review.
The conviction under the Domestic Violence Act was set aside and substituted with assault as defined in s 89(1)(a) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act, Chapter 9:23. The sentence of 14 months imprisonment (7 months suspended on community service conditions) was set aside and substituted with 7 months imprisonment, of which 4 months imprisonment is suspended on condition the accused is not during that period convicted of any offence involving violence for which he is sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a fine. Since the accused had already completed the community service imposed as an alternative to imprisonment, he did not need to serve the new sentence.
A single incident of violence between relatives should ordinarily be charged as assault under the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act rather than as physical abuse under the Domestic Violence Act, unless there is an allegation of a pattern of violence in its various forms against the victim. The Domestic Violence Act is intended to give courts wider latitude to impose stiffer penalties for repeated incidents of abuse, not to substitute common assault with the more serious offence of domestic violence. When charging under the Domestic Violence Act, the proper formulation is to cite section 3(1)(a) (which defines the conduct) as read with section 4(1) (which criminalises the conduct), not the reverse.
The court observed that the danger of misapplying the Domestic Violence Act is that police or victims may prefer domestic violence charges where ordinary assault would meet the justice of the case, for various reasons including sheer lack of knowledge. The court also noted that while the absence of a medical affidavit does not mean the complainant did not suffer injuries, it does mean there was nothing to prove the extent of injuries at court, which affects sentencing considerations. The court made reference to similar observations in S v Shonhiwa 2015 (2) ZLR 436.
This case provides important guidance on the proper application of the Domestic Violence Act in Zimbabwe. It clarifies that the Act is intended to address patterns of abusive behavior rather than single incidents of assault between relatives. The judgment serves to prevent the inappropriate use of domestic violence charges where ordinary assault charges would be more appropriate, ensuring that prosecutorial discretion is properly exercised and that the more serious domestic violence offences are reserved for cases involving repeated abuse. The case also provides technical guidance on the proper framing of charges under the Domestic Violence Act, clarifying that section 3(1)(a) defines the conduct while section 4(1) criminalises it.