Stanley Zhakata v Tichawanda Mandoza N.O. and N M Bank Limited

The applicant was dismissed from employment by the second respondent in terms of the Labour Relations Act [Chapter 28:01] as amended. He was alleged to have committed an act inconsistent with the fulfillment of the express or implied conditions of his contract of employment and fraud. The applicant approached the High Court seeking review of his dismissal on grounds of procedural irregularities. The respondents raised a point in limine objecting to the High Court's jurisdiction to hear the matter.

• Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to hear a review application in a labour matter in the first instance
• Whether section 89(6) of the Labour Relations Act [Chapter 28:01] confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Labour Court in all labour matters
• Whether an 'appeal' as defined in the Labour Relations Act includes a review
• Whether the applicant should have exhausted domestic remedies by approaching the Labour Court first

The matter was referred to the Labour Court for determination. Costs were ordered to be costs in the cause.

The binding legal principles established are: (1) Section 89(6) of the Labour Relations Act [Chapter 28:01] as amended confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Labour Court to hear and determine all labour matters in the first instance, excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court and all other courts except the Supreme Court on appeal; (2) A review is an application within the meaning of section 89(6); (3) When the High Court sits to review a matter, it sits as a court of first instance; (4) An 'appeal' under section 97 of the Labour Relations Act includes a review, as section 97(2)(b) specifically provides that an appeal may seek a review on any ground on which the High Court may review it; (5) The word 'appeal' in section 89 must be interpreted according to its special definition in section 97(2) of the Act, not its ordinary grammatical meaning; (6) Labour matters must be referred to the Labour Court in the first instance before proceeding to the High Court.

Bhunu J made several non-binding observations: (1) The judgment in Thomas Tuso v City of Harare HH 1-04 (which the judge had previously decided) had generated intense heat and legal debate, and the Supreme Court was yet to determine its correctness; (2) The judge speculated that some lawyers prefer the High Court to the Labour Court because there are better financial rewards to be gained at the expense of their clients; (3) The judge observed that in labour matters, poor indigent employees are often pitted against the vast wealth and resources of employers, and rich employers may use their financial muscle to gain unfair advantage in expensive courts; (4) The majority of employees who have lost their jobs are unable to afford the services of a lawyer at the Labour Court let alone at the High Court; (5) In the High Court, the odds are heavily tilted against unrepresented employees; (6) Reference of labour matters for review to the High Court where proceedings are complex, expensive and cumbersome can only serve to defeat the noble purpose for which the special Labour Court was created; (7) The Labour Court is presided over by eminent lawyers of the same training and experience as High Court judges.

This case is significant for reinforcing the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court in Zimbabwe in labour matters, including review applications. It confirms that the High Court does not have jurisdiction to hear labour review applications in the first instance. The judgment emphasizes the policy rationale behind the Labour Court's creation - to provide accessible, affordable, and specialized justice in labour disputes, particularly for employees who often lack the resources to litigate in the High Court. The decision interprets 'appeal' under the Labour Relations Act as including review proceedings, thereby bringing all forms of labour dispute resolution within the exclusive first-instance jurisdiction of the Labour Court.