Stanley Farms (Private) Limited v Mavington Chidongo and Others

Stanley Farms (Private) Limited obtained an eviction order against 21 respondents on 16 May 2017 under case HC 12326/15, which ordered their eviction from Dorith More and Stanley farms and interdicted them from re-entering. The respondents were evicted twice: first over 27-30 June 2017, and again on 10 December 2018 with police assistance. Despite these evictions, the applicant alleged that the respondents had returned to the farms in breach of the court order. Service of the contempt application was effected personally on some respondents (1st, 6th, 10th, 13th, 17th, 19th), through responsible persons on others (5th, 12th, 18th, 21st), by affixing to doors on others (7th, 8th, 20th), and attempted but failed for some (2nd, 3rd, 9th, 11th, 14th, 15th, 16th). The 1st respondent opposed the application, claiming they had not returned to the farms but only sent people occasionally to check on property and livestock left behind after the incomplete eviction.

• Whether the respondents were in contempt of the court order of 16 May 2017
• Whether the Sheriff's returns of service proved that the respondents had returned to and were occupying the farms
• Whether sending people to check on property left at the farms constituted a breach of the eviction and interdict order
• Whether non-compliance with the requirement for personal service in contempt applications (Order 5 r 39(1)) was fatal where respondents had actual knowledge and opposed the application

1. The 1st, 4th – 21st respondents were declared to be in contempt of court for failure to abide by the terms of the Order under case number HC 12326/15. 2. In the event of any of respondents 1st, 4th – 21st failing to comply with paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Court Order of 16 May 2017 under HC 12326/15 within forty-eight hours of the granting of this order, then such respondent is to be committed to Kadoma Remand Prison for one year. 3. The 1st, 4th – 21st respondents shall jointly and severally, the one paying the others to be absolved, pay the applicant's costs of suit on the legal practitioner and client scale.

The binding principles established are: (1) Any entry onto or presence at property subject to an eviction order and interdict, whether personally or through agents, constitutes contempt of court, regardless of the purpose or frequency of such entry. (2) The retention of property on evicted premises for an unreasonable period after eviction can constitute evidence of continuing occupation and contempt of the eviction order. (3) Where a respondent in contempt proceedings has actual knowledge of the application and actively opposes it, strict compliance with the requirement for personal service under Order 5 r 39(1) of the High Court Rules is not essential, as the purpose of the rule (ensuring awareness) has been satisfied. (4) Evicted persons who need to collect remaining property must arrange to do so through the property owner without personally entering the premises, to avoid breach of the interdict.

The court observed that if the respondents still had property at the farms more than two years after the eviction order, their proper remedy was to make an arrangement with the applicant to collect the property, and that in doing so, it would not be necessary for the respondents themselves to appear at the farms. The court also noted that the fact that eviction had to be done twice and required police assistance corroborated the respondents' unwillingness to comply with the court order. The court remarked on the contradiction in the 1st respondent's affidavit where he stated they were "law abiding citizens" while simultaneously admitting to sending people to the farm in breach of the interdict.

This case clarifies important principles in Zimbabwean civil contempt of court proceedings, particularly in the context of eviction orders. It establishes that: (1) any presence on or entry to property subject to an eviction and interdict order constitutes contempt, even if indirect through sending others; (2) leaving property on premises for an extended period after eviction can evidence unwillingness to relinquish occupation and support a finding of contempt; (3) the requirement for personal service in contempt applications under Order 5 r 39(1) can be excused where the respondent has actual knowledge and participates in opposing the application; and (4) courts will take a strict approach to enforcement of eviction orders where respondents repeatedly flout court orders, including through multiple evictions requiring police assistance. The case demonstrates the court's commitment to upholding the authority and dignity of court orders in property disputes.