St Martins Housing Co-operative Society Limited v City of Harare

St Martins Housing Co-operative Society Limited applied for review of a decision by the City of Harare dated 23 July 2025 refusing to award the applicant and its members 62 residential stands on grounds of financial incapacity. This followed a previous court order (HCH 1142/24) directing the respondent to re-conduct interviews of the applicant's members and sponsors to assess financial capacity and provide a written decision with reasons within specified timeframes. The applicant had engaged two sponsors: Triple Effort International Investments (Pvt) Limited and Pure Gold Housing Trust. After conducting interviews between 26-28 March 2025, the respondent concluded that the applicant lacked financial capacity, citing various reasons including that Pure Gold Housing Trust had failed to develop 2500 stands in a separate project, had illegally mortgaged undeveloped stands, and that the submitted agreements did not reflect proper funding commitment. The applicant challenged this decision as grossly irregular and unreasonable, arguing that its sponsors had demonstrated capacity in larger projects and had received approval from the Ministry of Local Government and Public Works.

• Whether the respondent's decision was delivered unreasonably late in contravention of the court order HCH 1142/24, constituting a gross irregularity
• Whether the finding that the applicant lacked financial capacity was grossly irregular and defied logic given the evidence submitted
• What powers the court has on review under section 27 and 28 of the High Court Act
• Whether the court should substitute its own decision for that of the administrative authority or refer the matter back

1. The respondent's decision of 23 July 2025 was set aside. 2. The respondent was ordered to comply with the order in HCH 1142/24 in light of the findings in this matter within thirty (30) days from the date of service of the order. 3. The respondent was ordered to pay costs on the ordinary scale.

An administrative decision will be set aside as grossly unreasonable where the decision-maker has failed to properly apply its mind to the evidence before it and has reached a conclusion based on ulterior motives, mala fides, or factors outside the terms of reference. However, on review under sections 27 and 28 of the High Court Act, the court's function is to scrutinize the legality of administrative action, not to substitute its own decision for that of the administrator. Where an administrative decision is found to be ultra vires or grossly irregular, the ordinary course is to set it aside and refer the matter back to the authority for a fresh decision, unless exceptional circumstances exist. The court will only depart from this principle where: (a) the end result is a foregone conclusion; (b) further delay could prejudice the applicant; (c) the extent of bias or incompetence makes it unfair to submit to the same jurisdiction; or (d) the court is in as good a position as the administrative body to make the decision.

The court observed that delay in delivering an administrative decision, while potentially giving rise to other remedies, does not in itself constitute a ground for review unless it amounts to a gross irregularity affecting the substance of the decision. The court noted that the applicant's grounds for review were "convoluted and verbose" when they essentially raised only two substantive issues. The court also remarked that it would not grant relief extending beyond the scope of the original court order (HCH 1142/24), suggesting that applicants should be careful to align their relief with the parameters set by previous orders. The court declined to award costs on a higher scale, finding no justification for such an order.

This case clarifies the scope of judicial review of administrative decisions in Zimbabwe, particularly regarding housing and land allocation decisions by local authorities. It demonstrates that while courts will not lightly interfere with administrative decisions, they will set aside decisions that are grossly unreasonable and based on mala fides or failure to apply one's mind to relevant evidence. The case reinforces the principle that on review, courts should generally refer matters back to the administrative authority rather than substitute their own decision, except in exceptional circumstances. It also illustrates the constitutional right under section 68 to administrative conduct that is lawful, reasonable, and procedurally fair. The case is important for cooperative housing societies and demonstrates judicial oversight of local authority decision-making in land allocation matters.